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SOMETHING NEW UNDER THE SUN:  
THE DRECP AND UTILITY-SCALE SOLAR 
ON THE NEW ENERGY FRONTIER 
Brent Resh* 
“It is time for legal scholars, legislatures, and municipal governments to dust 
off the Solar Law Reporters of the 1970s and embark upon a new effort to cre-
ate a better governance framework for renewable development. Without this 
framework, the laws that develop naturally in response to technological change 
will fill the gaps but will fall far short of their potential. While we may not need 
a ‘dramatic’ theory here, we should begin to anticipate the steps that will lead 
us toward a more sustainable world.”1 
“Existing laws and regulations are often inappropriate to the needs of specific 
solar technologies; just as the legal system adapted to the use of automobiles 
and electronic communication, it must evolve as solar technology comes into 
widespread use.”2 
The Desert Renewable Energy Conservation Plan (DRECP) is a program-
matic intergovernmental, interagency effort to spur development of utility-scale 
renewable-energy infrastructure in the deserts of southern California. As a verti-
cal and horizontal collaboration across multiple levels of government, the 
DRECP presents a compelling example by which to illustrate and evaluate Han-
nah Wiseman’s proposed “regional renewable governance” and “hybrid region-
al governance” solutions to the problems of fragmentation associated with the 
development of large-scale solar infrastructure. Although not regional in the 
sense that Wiseman proposed (its reach is limited to seven counties in Califor-
nia), the DRECP is nonetheless relevant to Wiseman’s proposed governance 
frameworks for renewable-energy development due to the number of entities and 
levels of government involved and the complexity of California’s regulatory envi-
ronment. This Note addresses the effectiveness of the DRECP in terms of Wise-
man’s renewable-governance framework in the context of large-scale solar-
energy development in California. 
                                                        
*  J.D. Candidate, Spring 2018, William S. Boyd School of Law, J.D.; Duke University, En-
vironmental Sciences, B.S. 2011. I would like to thank Professor Bret Birdsong for his in-
valuable help in formulating the topic of this Note. His guidance and comments were in-
strumental. I would also like to thank each of my colleagues on the Nevada Law Journal who 
had a hand in the painstaking process of editing, reviewing, and bringing this Note to publi-
cation. © 2017 Brent Resh. 
1  Hannah Wiseman et al., Formulating a Law of Sustainable Energy: The Renewables Com-
ponent, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 827, 906 (2011). 
2  Harold M. Hubbard, Foreword, 3 SOLAR L. REP. xvii, xviii (1981). 
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INTRODUCTION 
“[I]nnovations never happen as planned. . . .”3 
In 2011, the Obama administration described its vision for the future of re-
newable energy development as the “New Energy Frontier.”4 The U.S. De-
partment of the Interior (Interior Department) issued a report outlining a con-
certed effort by several administrative agencies, including the Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM) and the Department of Energy (DOE), to “standardize and 
streamline the authorization process for solar energy development projects” and 
“develop a suite of solar energy environmental policies and mitigation strate-
gies that would apply to the deployment of DOE-supported solar energy pro-
jects, whether located on BLM-administered lands or other Federal, state, trib-
al, or private lands.”5 Part of this plan included the pre-screening of public 
lands for qualities of technical suitability for utility-scale solar energy devel-
opment.6 For various reasons, the BLM determined that tracts of public land 
located in six states, including California and Nevada, contain the most suitable 
sites for developing large-scale solar infrastructure.7 Although the BLM’s early 
efforts to incentivize the development of these “Solar Energy Zones” had their 
fair share of setbacks and critics, the BLM pushed forward.8 
In September 2014, the Interior Department announced the release of the 
draft Desert Renewable Energy Conservation Plan (DRECP).9 As a collabora-
tive effort between multiple federal and California agencies, the proposed 
DRECP intended to “protect areas in the California desert important for wild-
life, recreation and other uses while streamlining permitting in areas appropri-
ate for siting of solar, wind and geothermal energy projects and associated 
transmission.”10 In September 2016, the BLM completed the first phase of the 
                                                        
3  GIFFORD PINCHOT III, INTRAPRENEURING: WHY YOU DON’T HAVE TO LEAVE THE 
CORPORATION TO BECOME AN ENTREPRENEUR 16 (1985). 
4  See generally U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR & U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NEW ENERGY FRONTIER: 
BALANCING ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ON FEDERAL LANDS (2011) [hereinafter NEW ENERGY 
FRONTIER]. 
5  Id. at 18. 
6  See id. 
7  Id. (Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah). 
8  See Nathaniel Logar, Note, When the Fast Track Hits the Off Ramp: Renewable Energy 
Permitting and Legal Resistance on Western Public Lands, 27 COLO. NAT. RESOURCES, 
ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 361, 373–79 (2016). 
9  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, U.S. Department of the Interior and State of Cali-
fornia Release Draft Desert Renewable Energy Conservation Plan for Public Review (Apr. 
26, 2016), https://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/us-department-of-the-interior-and-state-
of-california-release-draft-desert-renewable-energy-conservation-plan-for-public-review 
[https://perma.cc/Q6ZD-D8CS]. See generally U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT. ET AL., DRAFT 
DESERT RENEWABLE ENERGY CONSERVATION PLAN: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2014) [hereinaf-
ter DRAFT DRECP: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY]. 
10  Press Release, supra note 9. 
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DRECP by approving its Land Use Plan Amendment11 (LUPA) to manage re-
newable development and conservation on ten million acres of federal lands in 
the DRECP plan area.12 As it stands today, the DRECP remains incomplete;13 
however, the DRECP reflects a monumental, eight-year-long undertaking by 
multiple agencies across all levels of government, and it therefore deserves at-
tention and scrutiny as lawmakers, regulators, and local governments make fur-
ther progress in its implementation. Moreover, as “the most ambitious and in-
novative planning effort undertaken in the California desert,”14 the DRECP will 
surely serve as an example for other state and regional plans to follow. 
Solar power is here to stay,15 and increasing our reliance on solar technolo-
gies will have many benefits.16 Solar technologies have come a long way since 
the days of the Solar Law Reporters and President Jimmy Carter’s White House 
solar panels,17 but institutional and legal innovations are needed to support 
                                                        
11  U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., DESERT RENEWABLE ENERGY CONSERVATION PLAN: LAND 
USE PLAN AMENDMENT TO THE CALIFORNIA DESERT CONSERVATION AREA PLAN, BISHOP 
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN, AND BAKERSFIELD RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN (Sept. 
2016), http://drecp.org/finaldrecp/lupa/DRECP_BLM_LUPA.pdf [https://perma.cc/XGL3-
JM93] [hereinafter DRECP LUPA]. 
12  Cal. Energy Comm’n, What Is the DRECP?, DRECP, http://drecp.org [https://perma.cc/ 
AU36-RMBH] (last visited Oct. 25, 2017). 
13  As of September 14, 2016, Phase II of the DRECP had not been completed. See Helen 
O’Shea & Ralph Cavanagh, Conservation, Clean Energy and Climate Leadership, NRDC 
(Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/helen-oshea/conservation-clean-energy-and-
climate-leadership [https://perma.cc/X53H-2PND]. 
14  Id. 
15  See, e.g., Nishtha Chugh, ‘Trump Can’t Stop Renewables Energy Growth at Home or 
Abroad,’ FORBES (Jan. 31, 2017, 2:15 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/nishthachugh/ 
2017/01/31/trump-cant-stop-renewables-energy-growth-at-home-or-abroad/#21d3c035d884 
[https://perma.cc/K4PY-2UBR]. Utility-scale solar facilities are currently cost competitive 
with coal and natural-gas power plants, at least to the extent that a substantial tax-credit in-
centive for utility-scale solar development remains intact. Philip Warburg, In Clash of 
Greens, a Case for Large-Scale U.S. Solar Projects, YALE ENV’T 360 (Aug. 24, 2015), 
http://e360.yale.edu/features/in_clash_of_greens_a_case_for_large-scale_us_solar_projects 
[https://perma.cc/8552-3L2J]. 
16  See, e.g., Robert Glennon & Andrew M. Reeves, Solar Energy’s Cloudy Future, 1 ARIZ. J. 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 91, 93–94 (2010) (noting the potential for solar energy projects to create 
new “green collar” jobs); Garrick B. Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 
EMORY L.J. 877, 901–07 (2011) (explaining the benefits of energy entrepreneurship on the 
economy and environment). 
17  In 1979, President Carter had thirty-two water-heating solar panels installed on the roof of 
the White House in the wake of the recent national energy crisis, commenting, 
[A] generation from now, this solar heater can either be a curiosity, a museum piece, an example 
of a road not taken, or it can be a small part of one of the greatest and most exciting adventures 
ever undertaken by the American people; harnessing the power of the sun to enrich our lives as 
we move away from our crippling dependence on foreign oil. 
DAVID R. BOYD, THE OPTIMISTIC ENVIRONMENTALIST: PROGRESSING TOWARDS A GREENER 
FUTURE 22–28 (2015). 
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growth in this promising sector of energy development.18 As demonstrated by 
the many setbacks solar technology and law have faced to get where they are 
today, whether legal or technological, 
Innovations do not proceed smoothly from defining goals through planning to 
implementation of the plan. Despite the apparent rationality of later recountings, 
innovations never happen as planned because no one can accurately plan some-
thing that is really new! Instead, the early stages of innovation consist of groping 
toward a vision, counting one’s progress by what can be learned from mistakes, 
until at last one grasps a pattern worth repeating.19 
As the law continues to adapt to accommodate solar technology, even in-
complete and imperfect legal innovations such as the DRECP provide lawmak-
ers and regulators with patterns worth repeating and others worth discarding.20 
The DRECP has yet to prove an effective solution to the many administrative 
barriers and legal hurdles facing utility-scale solar development. But even as-
suming it “only holds a candle in sunshine,”21 the DRECP provides another in-
stance of patterns worth repeating and is therefore very much “something new 
under the sun.”22  
 Solar power need not be “an example of a road not taken.”23 Both past and 
future technological breakthroughs have the potential to reshape the American 
Southwest’s energy landscape, but the “New Energy Frontier” will remain un-
explored, and its potential unrealized, unless technological advancements are 
accompanied by commensurate legal advancements.24 Such needed break-
throughs and innovations are not only possible: they are probable. After all, the 
“[a]bility to change in the face of new circumstances is one of the great 
strengths of our system of law[,]”25 and “[l]aw perennially chases human 
needs.”26 
                                                        
18  Hubbard, supra note 2, at xvii. See generally, e.g., Glennon & Reeves, supra note 16; 
Wiseman et al., supra note 1. 
19  PINCHOT, supra note 3 at 16. 
20  See Hannah Wiseman, Expanding Regional Renewable Governance, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 477, 514–15 (2011). 
21  This colorful phrase is from a prose poem, WILLIAM BLAKE, THE MARRIAGE OF HEAVEN 
AND HELL (Dover 1994) (1794). 
22  See generally J.R. MCNEILL, SOMETHING NEW UNDER THE SUN: AN ENVIRONMENTAL 
HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY WORLD (2000). Contra generally Ecclesiastes 1:9 
(King James). Despite the Book of Ecclesiastes rather glum admonition that “[t]he thing that 
hath been, it is that which shall be, and that which is done is that which shall be done, and 
there is no new thing under the sun,” id., the history of environmentalism over the past fifty 
years seems to suggest just the opposite. 
23  See BOYD supra note 17 at 22. 
24  See Hubbard, supra note 2; see also Glennon & Reeves, supra note 16; Wiseman et al., 
supra note 1. 
25  Hubbard, supra note 2 at xvii. 
26  Wiseman et al., supra note 1, at 827. 
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I. THE PROBLEM 
“We pay a high price when we inadvertently create anticommons. . . .”27 
America’s New Energy Frontier can help displace America’s reliance on 
foreign oil and replace energy imports with energy independence. Many oppor-
tunities exist on this new renewable energy frontier, but this Note will focus on 
utility-scale solar development in California and the problems such develop-
ment faces. Section A uses the Ivanpah facility to illustrate issues associated 
with utility-scale solar development. Section B provides an overview of rele-
vant property theory, defines “anticommons property” and “regulatory anti-
commons,” and provides illustrations thereof. Section C describes how and 
why utility-scale solar projects exhibit qualities of anticommons property and 
implicate regulatory-anticommons problems, especially in California. 
A. Envisioning the Problem 
“Most persons do not see the sun.”28 
 Anyone who has recently driven Interstate 15 near the California-Nevada 
state line would recognize a utility-scale solar facility: The Ivanpah Solar Elec-
tric Generating Facility (Ivanpah) consists of over 300,000 software-controlled 
“heliostat” mirrors which reflect and focus sunlight onto boilers atop three 459-
foot-tall towers.29 It produces enough electricity to power more than 140,000 
homes,30 and it is impressively expansive. Covering over five square miles of 
federal land near the California-Nevada border,31 Ivanpah illustrates the scale 
and nature of the problems associated with developing utility-scale solar pro-
jects both in California and in general.  
As one drives by this gleaming oasis in the middle of the desert, many 
questions arise, the answers to which are not immediately apparent: Is it in Cal-
ifornia?—Nevada?—Or both?32 Is it on state or federal land?33 Where does the 
                                                        
27  Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from 
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 688 (1998). 
28  RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Nature, in THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF RALPH WALDO 
EMERSON 5–6 (Brooks Atkinson ed., 2000) (1836). 
29  Ivanpah Project Facts, BRIGHT SOURCE ENERGY, http://www.brightsourceenergy.com/ 
ivanpah-solar-project#.WdwYN62ZPEa [https://perma.cc/U9UY-GMTA] (last visited Oct. 
25, 2017). Ivanpah uses “concentrating solar power” (CSP) technology, a form of “solar 
thermal power” technology, rather than photovoltaic solar panels to produce electricity. See 
Dialogue, Nuts and Bolts of Technology: Closer Look at Utility-Scale Solar Power, 41 
ENVT’L L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10401, 10403–04 (2011); see also Ivanpah Project Facts, 
supra. 
30  Ivanpah Project Facts, supra note 29. 
31  See id.; see also infra note 148 (discussing the scale of Ivanpah to that of other solar facil-
ities in the region). 
32  Ivanpah is located entirely in California. Ivanpah Project Facts, supra note 29. 
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electricity go?34 Are those bursts of smoke fireworks?35 What is even less im-
mediately apparent upon gazing at Ivanpah is another question lurking in the 
background—one which pertains to the invisible legal reality implicit in such 
more obvious questions about the massive $2.2 billion facility36: how, exactly, 
did it get there?  
Even ignoring the economic hurdles in such a highly competitive market as 
that of the energy industry, developing a utility-scale solar facility involves ex-
pensive and time consuming regulatory compliance. Long before a utility-scale 
facility can begin to generate electricity in California, its developers will face 
the setbacks of a complex legal and regulatory process—a cloud that may in-
volve numerous private-property rights, overlapping jurisdictions, conflicting 
local ordinances and zoning codes, duplicative state and federal laws and regu-
lations, contentious opposition from neighbors, incompatible public and private 
interests, and more. These invisible clouds lurking over the development of 
utility-scale solar facilities, however invisible one may be to the casual 
passerby of such a facility, have both expected and unexpected consequences—
consequences commensurate to the scale of the facilities themselves. 
                                                                                                                                 
33  Ivanpah is exclusively on federal lands. Brian Skoloff & Michael R. Blood, Huge Solar-
Thermal Plant Opens Near Nevada-California Border, L.V. REV. J. (Feb. 13, 2014, 2:18 
PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/business/huge-solar-thermal-plant-opens-near-nevada-
california-border [https://perma.cc/TUW8-UF9M]. 
34  The electricity goes exclusively to California. Ivanpah Project Facts, supra note 29. 
35  Sadly, no. In fact, “[A]bout 6,000 birds die from collisions or immolation annually while 
chasing flying insects around the facility’s three 40-story towers[.]” Louis Sahagun, This 
Mojave Desert Solar Plant Kills 6,000 Birds a Year. Here’s Why That Won’t Change Any 
Time Soon, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2016, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/ 
la-me-solar-bird-deaths-20160831-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/HYQ8-RN6F]. The fa-
cility’s workers have a name for the puff of smoke left by immolated birds: “Streamers.” Id. 
This Note does not intend to make light of a serious problem: For a discussion about the im-
pact of renewable energy on birds and other animals, see Logar, supra note 8, at 367–68 
(discussing impact of renewable-energy infrastructure on birds), and see generally Alexandra 
B. Klass, Energy and Animals: A History of Conflict, 3 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 
159, 182–95 (2012). 
36  See generally Glennon & Reeves, supra note 16, at 105–11 (discussing the economics of 
solar energy and problems associated with solar generated energy competing with more 
cheaply produced electricity in the competitive energy market); Cassandra Sweet, Ivanpah 
Solar Plant May Be Forced to Shut Down, WALL. ST. J. (Mar. 16, 2016, 7:27 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/ivanpah-solar-plant-may-be-forced-to-shut-down-1458170858 
[https://perma.cc/LE6K-3C5Q] (discussing the facility’s problems in generating a sufficient 
amount of energy to meet its quotas). 
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B. The Panoply of Anticommons Clouds 
“The spectre of anticommons problems looms large in the multi-layered US 
regulatory framework.”37 
Garret Hardin published his seminal environmental essay, The Tragedy of 
the Commons,38 in 1968.39 “[E]mbraced as gospel,”40 it inspired a wave of 
scholarship exploring new avenues of its application and efficacy.41 Exploring 
one such tangential avenue in property theory, Michael Heller laid the modern 
foundation for its doppelgänger42: the “tragedy of the anticommons.”43  
1. From Commons to Property 
“I know not what to call this, nor will I urge, that it is a secret overruling de-
cree that hurries us on to be the instruments of our own destruction, even 
though it be before us, and that we rush upon it with our eyes open.”44 
Hardin illustrated what he coined the “tragedy of the commons” with a 
now famous scenario: numerous herdsmen fattening their cattle on communal 
open-access pasture.45 The “tragedy” in this situation is the tendency for the 
land to be ultimately overgrazed.46 As the story goes, each herdsman is presum-
ably rational and therefore aware of the negative utility of the cumulative ef-
fects of maintaining more and more cattle.47 Nonetheless, the immediate bene-
fit, to each herdsman, of maintaining more and more cattle is too enticing an 
opportunity to pass up: “[T]he rational herdsman concludes that the only sensi-
ble course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another; 
and another [etc.] . . . Therein is the tragedy.”48 
Hardin attributed this tragic tendency toward collective ruin to rather bleak 
conclusions about human nature. According to Hardin, the tragedy of the com-
                                                        
37  Giuseppe Bellantuono, The Regulatory Anticommons of Green Infrastructures, 37 EUR. J. 
L. ECON. 325, 343 (2014). 
38  Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968). 
39  Jonathan H. Adler, Property Rights and the Tragedy of the Commons, THE ATLANTIC 
(May 22, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/05/property-rights-and-
the-tragedy-of-the-commons/257549 [https://perma.cc/Y36Y-6QDJ]. 
40  Reza Dibadj, Regulatory Givings and the Anticommons, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1041, 1047 
(2003). 
41  See Frank van Laerhoven & Elinor Ostrom, Traditions and Trends in the Study of Com-
mons, 1 INT’L J. COMMONS 3–6 (2007). 
42  Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907, 907 (2004). 
43  See generally Heller, supra note 27. 
44  DANIEL DEFOE, ROBINSON CRUSOE 53 (Evan R. Davis ed., Broadview Press modernized 
ed. 2014) (1719). 
45  See Hardin, supra note 38, at 1244; see also Adler, supra note 39. 
46  See Hardin, supra note 38, at 1244; see also Adler, supra note 39. 
47  Hardin, supra note 38, at 1244; see also Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property 
Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 354 (1967). 
48  Hardin, supra note 38, at 1244. 
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mons is inevitable,49 most solutions are either ineffective or otherwise “objec-
tionable,”50 and the only truly effective and lasting solution is population con-
trol (of humans, not their cattle).51 However, two schools of thought emerged to 
challenge Hardin’s prophesy of environmental doomsday: regulation52 and pri-
vatization.53 In fact, one year before Hardin published The Tragedy of the 
Commons, Harold Demsetz laid the cornerstone for the latter school of thought 
in his seminal article, Toward a Theory of Property Rights,54 which discussed 
the commons as a problem of economics. Demsetz illustrated his theory with a 
discussion of a theoretical primitive society’s transition from the primordial 
“world of Robinson Crusoe” to the modern world of property.55  
Demsetz theorized that modern property rights emerged as the natural and 
logical result of market failures inherent in primitive systems of commons 
“ownership.”56 According to Demsetz, private ownership tends to “internalize 
many of the external costs associated with [a commons],” thereby “creat[ing] 
incentives [for the individual owners] to utilize [the] resources [of the land] 
more efficiently.”57 Private landowners can more efficiently reach effective 
agreements about how their adjacent parcels of property should be used in con-
cert to their collective best interests because, generally speaking, private own-
ership necessarily means fewer owners—and therefore fewer decision-makers 
and fewer parties are required to make any meaningful agreement.58 A defini-
tion of anticommons property begins to emerge here;59 however, a satisfactory 
definition of anticommons property must first begin with a satisfactory defini-
tion of “property.” 
                                                        
49  See id. 
50  See, e.g., id. at 1245. 
51  See, e.g., id. at 1243. Hardin discusses this Malthusian conclusion throughout his essay, 
which includes a section entitled “Freedom to Breed is Intolerable.” Id. at 1246. More recent 
scholarship tends to focus on Hardin’s discussion of the problem as one of “externalities,” 
while ignoring Hardin’s more controversial assessment that the true “root” of the problem is 
overpopulation. See, e.g., Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Pri-
vate Property Solution, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 533, 546 (2007) (citing Hardin, supra note 38, 
at 1245). 
52  See Hardin, supra note 38, at 1247 (discussing favorably the regulation solution, non-
ironically referred to as “[m]utual [c]oercion [m]utually [a]greed [u]pon.”); Sinden, supra 
note 51, at 533. 
53  See Sinden, supra note 51, at 533. Sinden was critical of privatization as a solution to the 
tragedy of the commons, see generally id., as was Hardin, see, e.g., Hardin, supra note 38, at 
1245. 
54  Demsetz, supra note 47. 
55  Id. at 347–53. 
56  See id. at 350. 
57  Id. at 356. 
58  See id. at 356–57. 
59  See generally Heller, supra note 27, at 622–24. 
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2.  From Property to Anticommons 
“Eighteen pockets in one suit! I haven’t [the] time.”60 
 “Property” is commonly used to refer to “[a]ny external thing over which 
the rights of possession, use, and enjoyment are exercised.”61 However, it is 
more technically correct to say that “property,” in a strictly legal sense, refers 
to “one’s exclusive right of ownership of a thing.”62 Thus, as an exclusive right, 
ownership implies exclusion: the owner, by definition, has the right to exclude 
any and all others from using the thing over which his property rights exist.63 In 
light of this distinction one can better understand the difference between “the 
lay intuition [that] . . . Blackacre itself is the core of private property”64 and the 
less intuitive idea that the right to exclude others from Blackacre is ultimately 
the core of “property.”65  
Without venturing too much farther into the weeds of Blackacre,66 Heller’s 
basic definition of anticommons property is sufficient for the purposes of this 
Note: anticommons property is any external thing over which “multiple owners 
are each endowed with the right to exclude others from a scarce resource, and 
no one has an effective privilege of use.”67 According to Heller, anticommons 
property is both a species of private property and distinguishable from private 
property. It is like private property in that all of its owners have rights of exclu-
sion; however, it is unlike private property in that such rights of exclusion are 
not exclusive—each owner has the right to exclude not only all non-owners, 
but also all of the other owners.68 This latter feature is the hallmark of anti-
commons property.69 The more owners there are, the more difficult is for them 
to reach any unanimous agreement, the lack of which ultimately results in the 
                                                        
60  A.A. MILNE, WINNIE-THE-POOH 92 (1954). 
61  Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
62  Id. 
63  See, e.g., Heller, supra note 27, at 624 n.9. 
64  Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1170 (1999). 
65  Although this overly simplistic characterization is sufficient for the purposes of this Note, 
the concept of private property is in fact much more complex, nebulous, and amorphous than 
this Note’s characterization might imply. See generally id. 
66  See generally, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory 
of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 15, 15 n.43 (2003) (citing Carol Rose, Rethinking 
Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 
3 n.4) (noting frequent confusion in distinguishing between property as used to describe both 
ownership and the thing that is the object of ownership); see also, generally, Property, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 61 (noting that there are two meanings associated 
with the word “property,” one that is used to refer to the right of ownership as “property,” 
and one that is used to refer to the object of ownership (e.g., land) as “property”). 
67  Heller, supra note 27, at 624. 
68  See id. 
69  This problem is essentially one of organization. See id. at 670–71 (describing the distinc-
tion between private and anticommons property in terms of vertical and horizontal organiza-
tion of the property rights). 
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under-utilization and inefficient use of the land and its resources.70 Herein lies 
the tragedy of the anticommons.71  
3. Exclusion-Equivalent Interests 
“[T]he precise definition of [property] rights can be somewhat fuzzy.”72 
Property rights alone are insufficient to explain the full complexity of the 
anticommons problems pertaining to the development of utility-scale solar pro-
jects. As proposed by Reza Dibadj in the context of “regulatory givings,” the 
features of an anticommons may emerge in circumstances that do not involve 
property rights.73 Dibadj’s interpretation relied on Wesley Hohfeld’s theoretical 
work on “jural correlatives,” which Hohfeld used to conceptually frame proper-
ty rights in terms of equivalent legal duties, and vice versa.74 According to 
Hohfeld, “[I]f X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the former’s land, 
the correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward X to stay off 
the place.”75 Dibadj applied this logic as meaning, “[I]f you have a right to pre-
vent me from hiking in the national forest, then I have a duty to stay off it. Note 
that you do not necessarily need to have a property interest in the forest [itself]; 
you merely need to have some right [or equivalent interest] to exclude me.”76 
Thus, Dibadj arrived at his more expansive, more “fuzzy” definition of anti-
commons: the “legal regime where the Hohfeldian right to exclude is created 
without granting the ‘bundle of rights’ that constitutes property.”77  
If non-property-based interests are functionally indistinguishable from 
property-based rights and otherwise fit Heller’s structural definition of an anti-
commons,78 then it follows that a broader definition of “anticommons”—one 
which includes both property-based rights of exclusion and their functional 
equivalents—will more fully reflect the complexity of the problems facing 
utility-scale solar development.79 Mimicking Dibadj’s logic in the context of 
                                                        
70  See id. at 624. Recall that the tragedy of the commons involved problems of overutiliza-
tion of resources. 
71  For a fascinating discussion of one extreme example of a tragedy of the anticommons in 
American history, see generally Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987). 
72  Dibadj, supra note 40, at 1049. 
73  Id. at 1050. 
74  Id. at 1048 (citing Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913)). 
75  Id. (quoting Hohfeld, supra note 74, at 32). 
76  Id. 
77  Id. at 1050. 
78  Heller defined “anticommons property” primarily in terms of the structure of exclusion 
rights, with an emphasis on the effect of exclusion (i.e. competing, horizontal rights without 
any hierarchy). See Heller, supra note 27, at 665. 
79  See Bellantuono, supra note 37, at 330–31; Wiseman, supra note 20, at 505–06; see also 
Dibadj, supra note 40, at 1049–51. This Note will henceforth refer to this broader definition 
as simply an “anticommons.” This definition of anticommons includes the same characteris-
18 NEV. L.J. 317, RESH - FINAL 1/2/18  10:46 AM 
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solar energy development means the following: If you have any legal, statutory, 
or regulatory interest (a cause of action, etc.) that can be exercised to forestall 
the development of my solar energy project on this parcel of private, state, 
and/or federal lands, then you have the functional equivalent of a property right 
in the parcel. Accordingly, as a voting member of the anticommons oligarchy 
governing the use of the parcel, your single dissenting vote can veto any and all 
others. Herein lies the broader tragedy of the anticommons: the compounding 
effect of adding legal and regulatory exclusion-equivalent interests to an al-
ready gridlocked decision-making process that lacks any effective hierarchy of 
authority and is already overcrowded with property-based exclusion rights.80 
4.  Regulatory Anticommons 
“Finding an ‘optimal’ regulatory arrangement is always a difficult task.”81 
William Buzbee coined the phrase “regulatory commons” to describe his 
theory of regulatory “gaps”: that “the ‘regulatory commons’ problem creates 
predictable incentives in complex, multi-layered political-legal contexts for so-
cial ills not to be overregulated, but to remain unaddressed, to remain gaps in 
regulation.”82 Whereas commons and anticommons property refer to something 
physical and corporeal such as land, regulatory commons and regulatory anti-
commons refer to the abstract and ethereal concepts of regulatory gaps and reg-
ulatory overlaps.83 
According to Buzbee’s theory, certain “social ills”—for instance, climate 
change—are uniquely difficult for entrenched, static systems of governance to 
manage and regulate.84 The features that make such social ills “unique” in this 
context can vary widely and are generally not definable without reference to 
their specific facts and circumstances;85 however, certain categories of regulato-
ry subject matter—for instance, environmental and natural resource manage-
ment—more frequently create regulatory-commons problems than do many 
other regulatory challenges.86 What is dispositive of a regulatory commons is a 
characteristic that becomes apparent only when the specific social ill is juxta-
                                                                                                                                 
tics of anticommons property mentioned in supra Section I.B.2. The only difference is the 
inclusion of exclusion-equivalent interests. 
80  See generally MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP 
WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES (2008). 
81  Buzbee, supra note 66, at 56. 
82  Id. at 5. 
83  Buzbee distinguished the regulatory-commons problem from Heller’s anticommons-
property problem as follows: “Where Heller focuses on fragmented real property [rights] as 
creating incentives for underinvestment in such property, [Buzbee] looks at . . . fragmented 
political-legal structures that do not match a social ill in cause or effect . . . and thereby 
prompt political underinvestment [in regulation].” Id. at 6. 
84  See id. at 5–6. 
85  See id. at 8, 22–23. 
86  See id. at 8. 
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posed against the system of governance and/or legal framework available to 
regulate it.87 Buzbee calls this principal characteristic a “mismatch.”88  
This “mismatch” arises where a particular problem poses a unique regula-
tory challenge, and the system of governance available to address the problem 
is uniquely inadequate to reach any effective solution. Such mismatches fre-
quently involve problems that impact multiple jurisdictions or governments, 
each of which is either unwilling or unable to effectively coordinate their inde-
pendent, and individually ineffective, regulatory frameworks.89 The typical re-
sult of such a mismatch, and the defining feature of a regulatory commons, is 
that the problem goes unsolved: the consequences of the problem fall through 
the cracks, the “regulatory gaps,” in a framework of governance ill equipped to 
address the unique challenge posed by the problem.90 Buzbee illustrated his 
theory with several examples, one of which was climate change.91  
What ultimately defines the tragedy of the regulatory commons is any sin-
gle jurisdiction’s ineffective control of the social ill causing the need for regula-
tion in the first place.92 However, the purpose of regulation is not limited to the 
control of social ills; rather, regulation is an attempt to strike a balance between 
maximizing social benefits and minimizing the social ills associated with the 
enjoyment of those social benefits.93 For example, in the context of Hardin’s 
communal pasture, an ideal regulatory regime would maintain the maximum 
number of cattle on the pasture (i.e., the maximum economic yield of the pas-
ture) and minimize the social ill of overgrazing.94 In this example, the tragedy 
of the regulatory commons is the ineffective minimization of overgrazing.95 
By contrast, the regulatory anticommons describes the opposite problem: 
the mismatch of the available governance structure and the challenge posed by 
maximizing social benefits to each jurisdiction involved leads to suboptimal 
social benefits for all jurisdictions involved.96 In a regulatory anticommons, the 
problem is neither too little, nor too ineffective, nor even too much regulation: 
the problem is the uncoordinated, overlapping, and duplicative regulations of 
                                                        
87  See id. at 13–14. 
88  Id. at 6–7. 
89  See id. at 22–27. 
90  See id. at 5. 
91  See id. at 8–13. 
92  See id. at 22, 27. 
93  See Lea-Rachel Kosnik, River Basin Water Management in the U.S.: A Regulatory Anti-
commons, 5 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 365, 378–79 (2010). 
94  See id.; see also, e.g., Buzbee¸ supra note 66, at 8–10 (discussing aquaculture as one ex-
ample of a commons that, as a result of attempts to privatize the commons for the benefits of 
privatization, gives rise to regulatory commons). 
95  See Kosnik, supra note 93, at 380. 
96  See id.; see also Buzbee¸ supra note 66, at 7 (“Social ills confronting regulatory commons 
dynamics will often go unaddressed, but when presented in a crisis setting, fragmented po-
tential regulators may simultaneously find incentives to act, perhaps in stringent and duplica-
tive ways.” (emphasis added)). 
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multiple jurisdictions.97 The net result—and the hallmark of a regulatory anti-
commons—is not the presence of regulatory gaps, but rather the presence of 
regulatory overlaps.98 Thus, while a regulatory commons is defined by regula-
tory gaps that lead to ineffective control of social ills, a regulatory anticom-
mons is defined by regulatory overlaps that lead to suboptimal social benefits.99 
C. Parts, Plots, and Parcels of Sunshine 
“Those who are ignorant of Geology, find no difficulty in believing that the 
world was made as it is; and the shepherd, untutored in history, sees no reason 
to regard the green mounds which indicate the site of a Roman camp, as aught 
but part and parcel of the primæval hill-side.”100 
The previous Section explored how the qualities of anticommons property 
are ultimately dependent on the species and arrangement of rights in the proper-
ty.101 This section discusses three related topics specific to utility-scale solar 
facilities. Subsection One discusses the various species of property rights in so-
lar energy access. Subsection Two discusses the unique nature of sunlight and 
its capture, and how these two features define a more specific form of what 
Hannah Wiseman called “renewable parcels”102—what this Note calls “solarsh-
eds”—a concept that begins to explain the jurisdiction-component of the prob-
lem. Subsection Three extends Wiseman’s concept to what this Note calls the 
“solar-project parcel”—to more fully illustrate the problem’s complexity.  
1. Owning (Part of) the Sun103 
“[A]ll sun is not created equal.”104 
The idea that one could “own” sunlight seems somewhat odd and even 
counter-intuitive. Even after centuries of property-rights proliferation,105 no 
                                                        
97  See Kosnik, supra note 93, at 380; see also Bellantuono, supra note 37, at 328–34. 
98  Kosnik, supra note 93, at 380. 
99  Compare Kosnik, supra note 93, at 380, with Buzbee, supra note 66, at 5, 7. 
100  THOMAS H. HUXLEY, Criticisms on “The Origin of Species,” in DARWINIANA: ESSAYS 80, 
106 (1896). 
101  See supra Section I.B. 
102  See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 20, at 499. 
103  The title of this Subsection is taken from a short e-book, J. SILVER, OWNING THE SUN 
(2016) (ebook), available at https://www.amazon.com/Owning-Sun-J-Silver-ebook/dp/B01K 
J951MS [https://perma.cc/85AM-WR87]. 
104  JAYME JENKINS & BILLIE BROWNELL, GARDEN RULES: THE SNAPPY SYNOPSIS FOR THE 
MODERN GARDENER 59 (Billie Brownell et al. eds., 2011). 
105  Various rights to access sunshine have been recognized by several legal and land-
planning regimes dating back to antiquity. See Sara C. Bronin, Solar Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 
1217, 1218–19 (2009); Alexandra B. Klass, Property Rights on the New Frontier: Climate 
Change, Natural Resource Development, and Renewable Energy, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 63, 96–
97 (2011). 
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layperson today would readily conceive that someone might “own” the sunlight 
striking her face—even though that same person would have virtually no doubt 
that someone must own the land she was standing on. After all, sunlight is a 
“universally abundant resource[].”106 Modern American law largely reflects this 
hesitation to recognize sunlight as something that can be privately owned, 
bought, and sold.107 Nonetheless, many states protect solar access as a private 
property right.108 Just how, exactly, does one “own” access to sunlight? Al-
though the answer varies by state,109 the most common approach involves an 
easement and/or servitude on real property.110 Other approaches involve various 
forms of leases, permits, and even statutory restrictions on certain real-property 
interests and conveyances.111  
For instance, both California and Nevada have statutes recognizing “solar 
easements.”112 A solar easement is created through a voluntary agreement be-
tween two owners of neighboring parcels of real property, that one owner will 
not use his land in any way (e.g., build a skyscraper) that would interfere with 
the other landowner’s ability to collect and convert sunlight into useable energy 
and heat.113 However, once the agreement is made and various statutory re-
quirements are met,114 the created easement is much more than any typical con-
tract: the easement and/or servitude “will run with the land.”115 In other words, 
the first owner’s obligation not to interfere with the neighboring parcel’s access 
to sunlight will pass to any subsequent owner of the first parcel—as will the 
neighbor’s right to enforce that obligation.116 Thus, the neighbor—and any fu-
                                                        
106  Wiseman, supra note 20, at 499. 
107  See Bronin, supra note 105, at 1222–23. 
108  Klass, supra note 105, at 95. 
109  See generally Klass, supra note 105, at 95–102. 
110  Klass, supra note 105 at 101–02 tbl.1 (listing states by type of solar-access protection). 
111  See Klass, supra note 105 at 97. 
112  Klass, supra note 105, at 97, 101 tbl.1; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 801.5 (West 2007); 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 111.370 (2015). 
113  Klass, supra note 105, at 97. Some scholarship has questioned the sufficiency of solar 
easements in certain circumstances, particularly when no voluntary agreement between pri-
vate parties can be reached. See, e.g., Sara C. Bronin, Modern Lights, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 
881, 911 (2009); see also, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 801.5. Currently the solar easements rec-
ognized by California and Nevada are tied to use of statutorily defined technology. See CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 801.5; NEV. REV. STAT. § 111.375 (2015). In other words, a right to access sun 
for sunbathing is not an easement recognized in California or Nevada. However, unique to 
California are various statutory protections in place for a wide variety of solar-access rights. 
See, e.g., Solar Shade Control Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 25980–25986 (West 2016). See 
generally Klass, supra note 105, at 99–100 (discussing California’s statutory scheme for so-
lar-access rights). 
114  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 801.5(b) (listing requirements for an instrument creating a 
solar easement). 
115  Klass, supra note 105, at 97. 
116  See id. The first parcel is called the “servient” or “burdened” estate and the second parcel 
is called the “dominant” or “benefited” estate. E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 111.375. 
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ture owner of the dominant parcel—“cannot be disseized or otherwise ousted 
of” that right, regardless of who comes to own the servient parcel.117 
California and Nevada are also among several states that have adopted 
statutes voiding provisions in deeds and contracts that prohibit a landowner’s 
use of solar technologies.118 California and Nevada have also limited the ability 
of local governments and homeowner associations from enforcing local ordi-
nances, zoning codes, and restrictive covenants that unreasonably affect solar 
energy use.119 California also offers statutorily defined leaseholds and grants 
specifically for utility-scale solar development on state-public lands.120 Califor-
nia also has a program for local governments to purchase and set aside public 
lands for solar energy use.121 
Solar energy development on federal lands is subject to the Federal Land 
Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA),122 which set various require-
ments for developers to acquire solar “right-of-way” authorizations to develop 
projects on federal lands.123 Under FLPMA, the BLM issues solar right-of-way 
authorizations in the form of leases and grants.124 Leases are issued through a 
competitive bidding process, while grants are issued through a non-competitive 
application.125 Acquiring a solar right-of-way lease is a complex process that 
generally includes compliance with the extensive, time-consuming require-
ments of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).126 The BLM 
recognized this holdup as being counterproductive to renewable energy devel-
opment on federal lands. To address the issue, the BLM began conducting vari-
ous efforts to both expedite development of certain areas and coordinate with 
                                                        
117  See, e.g., Hyde Road Dev., LLC v. Pumpkin Assoc., LLC, 21 A.3d 945, 948 (Conn. App. 
Ct. 2011). 
118  See Klass, supra note 105, at 101 tbl.1; see also, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 714 (West 2007); 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 278.0208 (2015). 
119  See Klass, supra note 105, at 102 tbl.1; see also CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 714, 714.1; NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 278.0208. See generally Troy A. Rule, Renewable Energy and the Neighbors, 
2010 UTAH L. REV. 1223 (discussing homeowner-association restrictions on small-scale so-
lar energy systems on private property); John Wiley, Private Land Use Controls as Barriers 
to Solar Development: The Need for State Legislation, 1 SOLAR L. REP. 281 (1979). 
120  See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 6501–6509 (West 2001) (general leases for use of pub-
lic land); CAL. WATER CODE § 141 (2009) (allowing private entities to lease certain parts of 
“State Water Project” lands for installation of solar technologies). 
121  CAL. GOV’T. CODE §§ 51190–51192.2 (2012) (“solar-use easements”). 
122  43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1785 (2012). 
123  See 43 C.F.R. §§ 2806.50–2806.58 (2017) (solar right-of-ways under FLPMA). See gen-
erally Siobhan McIntyre & Timothy P. Duane, Water, Work, Wildlife, and Wilderness: The 
Collaborative Federal Public Lands Planning Framework for Utility-Scale Solar Energy 
Development in the Desert Southwest, 41 ENVT’L L. 1093 (2011). 
124  See 43 C.F.R. § 2806.50. 
125  Id. § 2809.10. See generally id. §§ 2809.10–2809.19 (competitive-bidding process for 
solar and wind rights-of-way); id. §§ 2804.10–2804.40 (applying for FLPA grants). 
126  See McIntyre & Duane, supra note 123, at 1111. See generally National Environmental 
Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 to 4370m–12 (2012). 
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regional, state, and local governments to make the compliance process more 
efficient.127  
All such existing state and federal laws governing solar-access rights gen-
erally reflect the tension between the unique qualities of solar energy and the 
narrow, rigid confines of traditional property law.128 To a large extent this mis-
match makes sense: after all, utility-scale solar energy projects first require, as 
a practical matter, land. Without possessory estates in land, developers cannot 
build the technology and supporting infrastructure necessary to harness the 
power of sunlight. Once the necessary possessory estates are acquired, devel-
opers may, as a secondary matter, prefer to protect their investments by secur-
ing easements from surrounding land. However, this picture is incomplete: like 
sunlight, not all land is equally useful for utility-scale solar.129  
2. Solarsheds: Plots of Solar Energy 
“Nature eschews regular lines.”130 
The sun may shine (nearly) everywhere, but it does not shine everywhere 
equally.131 The quality of sunlight available for solar collection at any given lo-
cation is called “solar insolation”—the rate at which energy from the sun 
strikes a defined unit area of the earth’s surface (usually expressed as an annual 
average of watts per square meter)—and it is determined by various factors, in-
cluding latitude, time of day, local topography, and even local weather pat-
terns.132 Due to these geographic variations, sunlight is a “fugitive resource[]”: 
one must be at the right place and time to capture it.133 For utility-scale capture 
of solar energy, the “right place” is defined by two considerations: first, where 
is solar irradiance intense enough to make solar-energy capture there economi-
cal; and second, where is available land amenable enough to construction of 
infrastructure required for solar-energy capture.134 The right place in terms of 
the first consideration is called the “fugitive estate,” and the right place in terms 
                                                        
127  See generally McIntyre & Duane, supra note 123, at1165. 
128  See generally Bronin, supra note 113; Bronin, supra note 105; Klass, supra note 105, at 
97. 
129  See generally Wiseman, supra note 20, at 479–86, 499–506; Wiseman et al., supra note 
1, at 860–67. 
130  MATURIN M. BALLOU, NOTABLE THOUGHTS ABOUT WOMEN: A LITERARY MOSAIC 170 
(1882) (quote attributed to John Greenleaf Whittier). 
131  See William B. Stine & Michael Geyer, 2. The Sun’s Energy,  POWER FROM THE SUN, 
http://www.powerfromthesun.net/Book/chapter02/chapter02.html [https://perma.cc/TX7F-Q 
NYT] (last visited Feb. 26, 2017). 
132  See id. For a map of the U.S. showing solar insolation, see Billy Roberts, Concentrating 
Solar Resource of the United States, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB. (Oct. 20, 2008), 
http://www.nrel.gov/gis/images/map_csp_national_lo-res.jpg [https://perma.cc/S3UD-AK 
Q4]. 
133  Wiseman, supra note 20, at 480; see also Henry E. Smith, Governing Water: The Semi-
commons of Fluid Property Rights, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 445, 448 n.10. (2008). 
134  Wiseman, supra note 20, at 499. 
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of the second is called the “surface estate.”135 Wiseman calls any theoretical re-
gion where these two nebulous estates overlap the “ ‘renewable parcel.’ ”136 
This Note calls such overlapping regions “solarsheds.”137 
 Solarsheds help explain why solar projects tend to implicate anticommons 
problems. It makes sense that an overlap defined by the vagaries and vicissi-
tudes of nature would correlate rather imperfectly with the law’s neatly deline-
ated squares of property and jurisdiction.138 Moreover, state counties are not the 
only jurisdictions involved in the desert southwest: there are also tracts of fed-
eral land interspersed across county and state lines.139 The massive scale of util-
ity-scale solar projects and their dependence on being located within a so-
larshed dictate the likelihood that many of the best sites for development will 
cross multiple parcels of private property and jurisdictional lines.140 Herein lies 
a significant reason for the cloud of anticommons problems hovering over the 
prospects of utility-scale solar development. 
3.  The Solar-Project Parcel 
“Give me the splendid silent sun with all his beams full-dazzling. . . .”141 
This Note proposes an extension of Wiseman’s renewable-parcel concept 
and the solarshed concept discussed above.142 Consider the perspective of a de-
veloper of a utility-scale solar project: if you wanted to develop such a project, 
                                                        
135  Id. 
136  Id. 
137  Renewable parcels have also been called “energysheds.” See, e.g., KATE KELLY & KIM 
DELFINO, DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, SMART FROM THE START: RESPONSIBLE RENEWABLE 
ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTHERN SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY 3 (Kate Davies & James 
Navarro eds., 2012), 
http://www.defenders.org/sites/default/files/publications/smartfromthestartreport12_print.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/268E-PKW8] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017) (“ ‘[E]nergysheds’ [are] areas at a 
regional or county level that have renewable energy resources and the appropriate land, envi-
ronmental characteristics and other resources with the highest potential for effective . . . re-
newable energy development.”). For a visual representation of solarsheds, see Nat’l Renew-
able Energy Lab., Concentrating Solar Power Prospects of the Southwest United States, 
OPENEI, http://en.openei.org/w/images/0/06/NREL-csp-sw3pct.jpg [https://perma.cc/8CMB-
3SMR] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017) (map of locations ideal for concentrating solar technology 
in the southwest). For additional similar maps, including similar maps of individual states, 
see Map Search, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB, http://www.nrel.gov/gis/mapsearch 
[https://perma.cc/DDX5-HH3S] (last visited Sept. 2, 2017). 
138  For instance, compare the following, Map of Counties in the Southwest, WORLD ATLAS, 
http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/namerica/usstates/counties/usasmall.gif 
[https://perma.cc/5JAC-4RUK] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017), with Nat’l Renewable Energy 
Lab, Concentrating Solar Power Prospects of the Southwest United States, supra note 137. 
139  The Southwestern United States, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV. https://geochange.er.usgs.gov/ 
sw/resources/sw_basemap/southwest_USA.gif [https://perma.cc/RN4V-F59Z] (last visited 
Oct. 26, 2017). 
140  See generally Wiseman, supra note 20, at 499–509. 
141  WALT WHITMAN, Give Me the Splendid, Silent Sun, in LEAVES OF GRASS 77, 77 (1902). 
142  See supra Section I.C.2. 
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where would you want to build it? First, you would start with a map of availa-
ble fugitive estates (i.e., a map of solar insolation in the U.S.), which would 
surely lead you to conclude that your ideal solar project parcel must exist 
somewhere in the desert southwest. Second, you narrow your focus on the de-
sert southwest to those regions where you could actually build a utility-scale 
solar facility (you are now looking at a map of a solarshed, which takes into 
consideration not only available fugitive estates but also available land-surface 
estates). But your search is not done there.143 
Additional parameters abound. A solar energy facility requires land for not 
only the solar technology itself, but also for transmission lines, roads, and other 
general-purpose structures, and for any other supporting apparatus the facility 
may require, including electrical generators, turbines, and batteries (collective-
ly, the infrastructure parcel). The entire facility and its supporting infrastructure 
will exist as components of an ecosystem and larger eco-region and, as such, 
will impact plants and wildlife as do all other living and inanimate components 
of that ecosystem and eco-region (the eco-parcel). Its construction, operation, 
and maintenance will have a water footprint, an ecological footprint, a cultural-
historical footprint, and an aesthetic footprint (each of these might be consid-
ered separately or collectively as the footprint parcel, which may span far be-
yond the contours of the facility itself). Finally, however remote and secluded 
its location may be, the solar energy facility will have neighbors, including the 
workers who build and maintain it, persons who live near it, and travelers who 
drive by or fly over it.144  
A solar-project parcel is the result of such considerations and would reflect 
the land and resources a solar energy facility impacts and requires. A solar-
project parcel should include all constituent parcels of land relevant to the facil-
ity, its construction, and its footprints—including, inter alia, a transmission 
parcel, an ecosystem estate, a water estate, and a jurisdiction estate. This per-
spective will direct and focus legal analysis to inform planning and assessments 
of large-scale solar facilities. This framework also lends itself to analysis of the 
anticommons problem. 
                                                        
143  Further considerations would include: whether existing transmission lines are present; on 
what land/jurisdiction (private, state, or federal) the utility-scale project will be built; and 
whether that land will require costly compliance with extensive regulations. As discussed in 
the next Section, these considerations reflect the problematic impact of the regulatory anti-
commons on utility-scale solar development. See generally infra Section I.D. 
144  See generally Rebecca R. Hernandez et al., Solar Energy Development Impacts on Land 
Cover Change and Protected Areas, 112 PROC. NAT’L ACADEMY SCI. U.S. 13579, 13579–84 
(2015); R.R. Hernandez et al., Environmental Impacts of Utility-Scale Solar Energy, 29 
RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVS., 766, 768–73 (2014); Uma Outka, The Renewa-
ble Energy Footprint, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 241, 247–54 (2011). 
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D. Anticommons Clouds, Crepuscular Development 
“The more complex, multilayered, or fragmented the legal and political setting, 
the more likely it is that regulatory commons [and anticommons] dynamics will 
arise.”145 
Three basic issues are discussed in this Section. Subsection One offers a 
brief summary of the development process and anticommons problems therein 
by considering a theoretical solar project parcel that crosses multiple jurisdic-
tions. Subsection Two offers an example of an existing solar project in the 
DRECP plan area. Finally, Subsection Three describes the impact that regulato-
ry-anticommons problems have on solar energy development in the DRECP 
plan area and the significance of that impact on, perhaps surprisingly, the envi-
ronment. 
1.  The Anticommons Behind the Plug 
“[E]nergy consumers prefer not to ‘look behind the plug.’ ”146 
Utility-scale solar projects tend to be big. For example, within the DRECP 
plan area, thirty-six existing147 solar projects collectively cover nearly 29,000 
acres—averaging out to about 800 acres per project.148 By comparison, New 
York City’s Central Park covers 843 acres.149 Just as Central Park spans many 
city blocks, the average-sized utility-scale solar facility tends to span many in-
dividual parcels of land.150 Thus, the sheer size of most solar facilities provides 
the first reason for their anticommons problems. However, unlike the neatly de-
lineated contours of central park, the contours of a typical solar-project parcel, 
                                                        
145  Buzbee, supra note 66, at 22. 
146  Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, 2014 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1, 3 (2014) [hereinafter Hybrid Energy Governance]. 
147  “Existing” includes operational projects and projects in construction as of October 2013. 
U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT. ET AL., DRAFT DESERT RENEWABLE ENERGY CONSERVATION 
PLAN app. o, at O-1 (2014) [hereinafter DRAFT DRECP]. Only solar projects with available 
acreage data were included in the calculations. 
148  See id. at O-2 to O-5. The largest solar-energy project spans 4,144 acres; see id. at O-2, 
while the smallest spans just 17 acres. See id. at O-4. Both employ photovoltaic technology. 
See id. at O-2, O-4. Of the thirty-six total solar-energy projects, all but three employ photo-
voltaic technology. See id. Excluding those three projects, projects employing PV technolo-
gy have an average size of about 650 acres. See id. at O-2 to O-5. One of the three projects 
that do not employ PV technology is the Ivanpah facility (discussed in supra Section I.A.), 
which spans 3,471 acres and was the only solar-power-tower project in the DRECP plan area 
as of August 2014. See id. at O-2. 
149  Alex Van Buren, 12 Secrets of New York’s Central Park, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Jan. 27, 
2016), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/travel/12-secrets-new-yorks-central-park-1809579 
37 [https://perma.cc/5JSU-P38G]. 
150  See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 20, at 482–83. 
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as discussed above, are not so neatly defined.151 As such, utility-scale solar fa-
cilities cannot easily be built in the middle of a large city. 
Rather, solar project parcels require large swaths of mostly unoccupied 
lands, and such regions are frequently the most untouched by human en-
croachment and the most protected by environmental laws.152 This latter feature 
triggers numerous state and federal environmental regulations—even if the pro-
ject parcel occupies only private lands.153 Additionally, the more remote the 
project site, the more difficult it may be to connect the facility to the transmis-
sion lines required to transport the generated electricity to more populated re-
gions.154 Add to the transmission issue the reality that solar facilities require 
workers for operations and maintenance, and you arrive at another reality: that 
project sites must be at least somewhat accessible—either close to, or on the 
outskirts of, moderately populated towns, or—at a minimum—located near a 
major interstate freeway or state high way.155 This latter feature triggers a host 
of additional federal and state regulations—such as transportation regulations 
pertaining to freeways, highways, airports, etc. Transportation is just one of 
many relevant categories of laws and regulations involved. Furthermore, in ad-
dition to those many state and federal laws/regulations, there are municipal 
zoning codes and various local ordinances pertaining to such things as safety, 
noise, pollution, aesthetics, etc.—noncompliance with any of which may bring 
the development process to a screeching halt.156  
 A typical solar project has anticommons qualities by virtue of its tentacle-
like spatial reach that can implicate several jurisdictions,157 multiple property 
rights, disparate government regulations, and variegated public and private in-
terests.158 Prospective developers of such a multi-jurisdiction solar project 
would have to navigate each of the following potential hurdles before ever 
breaking ground: negotiating with owners of private property and adjacent pri-
                                                        
151  See id. at 499. See generally, supra Section I.C.2–.3. 
152  Morgan Lee, Solar Energy Blotting Out Nature, Farms in California, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB. (Oct. 19, 2015, 6:58 PM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-big-solar-big-
impacts-2015oct19-story.html [https://perma.cc/XEB2-457Z]. 
153  See generally Amy Wilson Morris & Jessica Owley, Mitigating the Impacts of the Re-
newable Energy Gold Rush, 15 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 293 (2014). 
154  For a discussion about transmission, see generally Wiseman, supra note 20, and Wise-
man et al., supra note 1, at 854. 
155  See Renewable Energy Maps, IMPERIAL COUNTY PLAN. & DEV. SERVS. (Aug. 28, 2017), 
http://www.icpds.com/?pid=2934 [https://perma.cc/V3UP-B38D]. 
156  See, e.g., K.K. DuVivier, The Superagency Solution, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV. 189, 195–96 
(2014); Sarah Imhoff, Note, A Streamlined Approach to Renewable Energy Development: 
Bringing the United States into a Greener Energy Future, 26 GEO. INT’L ENV’T. L. REV. 69, 
80, 87 (2013). 
157  Recall that the location of a solar project parcel is dependent on the availability of sun-
light and land, as defined by nature. One may thus safely and reasonably assume there is a 
fair chance that such a parcel may cross lines of jurisdiction. This assumption is qualitative 
and not quantitative. 
158  See Wiseman, supra note 20, at 499–506. 
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vate property for any leases, licenses, or easements that may be needed; com-
plying with all relevant laws at the federal, state, and municipal level; and ac-
quiring final project approval from state and/or federal regulatory agencies.159 
Assuming the developer is successful, the project would still need to survive 
any so-called “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) opposition by public officials,160 
and any judicial challenges by representatives of tribal, environmental, and oth-
er interest groups.161 Moreover, a multijurisdictional solar-project parcel is sub-
ject to overlapping regulatory requirements, which may be disparate, conflict-
ing, and duplicative.162 As more parcels of private property, more 
jurisdictions/governments, and more levels of governance become involved in 
the development process, the number and complexity of anticommons prob-
lems grow exponentially. Each of the players in that process has an exclusion-
equivalent interest in the project parcel and can therefore potentially impede the 
project.163 This complex web of parties, rights, interests, laws, and regulations 
contributes to an anticommons of immense proportions. 
2. A Solar-Project Parcel in Imperial County, California 
“[T]he challenges of addressing a panoply of different regulations and the va-
garies of unpredictable and lengthy local processes can create stifling, if not 
suffocating, risks that drive up costs and make it impossible for renewable en-
ergy generation to compete with conventional energy sources for investment 
dollars.”164 
 Even solar energy facilities located entirely in one county and entirely on 
private land demonstrate the anticommons problem. For example, one utility-
scale PV solar facility (250 MW capacity) covering nearly 3,000 acres in Impe-
rial County required approval by five local, nine state, and two federal agen-
cies.165 This facility, Wisteria Ranch Solar Energy Center, encompasses thirty-
                                                        
159  See generally Trevor D. Stiles, Regulatory Barriers to Clean Energy, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 
923, 925–35 (2010); Outka, supra note 144; Wiseman et al., supra note 1; Imhoff, supra 
note 156; Kevin A. James, Note, Expediting the Permitting Process for Desert Solar Pro-
jects, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 573 (2011); Brian Troxler, Note, Stifling the Wind: California 
Environmental Quality Act and Local Permitting, 38 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 163 (2013). 
160  James, supra note 159, at 579–80. 
161  See Imhoff, supra note 156, at 90–93; Logar, supra note 8, at 367–71; see also, e.g., 
Sammy Roth, Solar and Wind Are Booming–Just Not in the California Desert, DESERT SUN 
(MAY 8, 2017, 5:27 PM), http://www.desertsun.com/story/tech/science/energy/2017/05/09/ 
solar-and-wind-booming-just-not-california-desert/311540001 [https://perma.cc/UDJ7-6E 
MH]. 
162  See Stiles, supra note 159, at 924–25; Wiseman et al., supra note 1, at 898–99. 
163  See Wiseman, supra note 20, at 499–506. 
164  DuVivier, supra note 156, at 195–96 (footnotes omitted). 
165  CTY. OF IMPERIAL, STATE OF CAL., WISTARIA RANCH SOLAR ENERGY CENTER: DRAFT EIR 
1.0-7 to 11, 2.0-1 (Aug. 2014), http://www.icpds.com/?pid=4194 [https://perma.cc/3KZZ-
ZTEW] [hereinafter WISTARIA RANCH DRAFT EIR]. 
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two parcels that were once privately owned by twelve separate landowners.166 It 
implicated at least four federal laws, at least six state laws, multiple state and 
federal regulations, and numerous local land-use ordinances and zoning 
codes.167 The approval process required the developer to submit seventeen con-
ditional use permits (CUPS) and seventeen variance requests (to permit a max-
imum height of 140 feet for transmission structures in lieu of the zoning limita-
tion of 120 feet) to the local government of Imperial County.168 Additionally, 
the developer needed the Imperial County to approve at least fourteen other 
general categories of various permits, agreements, and other local require-
ments.169 Luckily for the developer, the Wistaria Ranch project (just barely) did 
not cross county lines.170 What one sees in existing solar-project parcels in Cal-
ifornia is an attempt to fit solar energy development, with all of its unique 
complexities and features, through the rigid confines of legal systems and regu-
latory regimes neither designed nor well equipped to effectively manage such 
development: the proverbial square peg through a round hole.171 Wistaria 
Ranch would have been subject to largely different ordinances and codes at a 
minimum, and, at the maximum, it may not have been approved as it presently 
stands in Imperial County had it been considered elsewhere.172 
This process is no doubt frustrating for utility-scale solar developers. For 
instance, the permitting and approval process for renewable-energy develop-
ment within a single county in California can last as long as four years.173 Se-
lecting a project site that crosses county lines would duplicate much of what 
would be the already lengthy process and complex requirements of a single ju-
risdiction.  
                                                        
166  Id. at 2.0-2. The story is quite similar for utility-scale wind projects: one such mega wind 
farm (750 MW) covering nearly 10,000 acres in Kern County encompassed 604 parcels of 
once privately-owned land and required approval from at least eight local, four state, and 
three federal agencies. Troxler, supra note 159, at 170, n.61; see also CTY. OF KERN, STATE 
OF CAL., ALTA INFILL II WIND ENERGY PROJECT: DRAFT SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT REPORT 3-1, (Aug. 2011) http://www.kerncounty.com/planning/pdfs/eirs/alta_wind_ 
infill [https://perma.cc/75D2-V6EB]. 
167  See WISTARIA RANCH DRAFT EIR, supra note 165, at 1.0-8 to 1.0-13. These numbers are 
low estimates for whatever the true numbers may be. The Draft EIR for the project spans 
thousands of pages. See generally id. This author gave up counting through, for instance, the 
forty-page document describing federal, state, and local land-use laws, regulations, and ordi-
nances covering the project. Id. at 4.2-1 to 4.2-40. The Draft EIR also contained forty-two 
pages of aesthetic analysis, see id. at 4.1-1 to 4.1-42, and several hundred pages of traffic-
impact analysis, see id. at app. b, pts. 1–6 (“Draft Traffic Impact Analysis”). 
168  Id. at 1.0-2. 
169  Id. at 1.0-8. 
170  Id. at 1.0-1. For a bird’s eye view of this project parcel, see id. 2.0-5. 
171  For a map of renewable energy development in Imperial County, see Renewable Energy 
Maps, supra note 155. 
172  See generally, e.g., Troxler, supra note 159, at 167–69. 
173  See Troxler, supra note 159, at 171; see also id. at 177–87. 
18 NEV. L.J. 317, RESH - FINAL 1/2/18  10:46 AM 
340 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18:317  
3. Big Solar, Big Impacts: The Effect of Anticommons in California 
“[W]e see that ‘big solar’ is competing for space with natural areas. Knowing 
this is vital [because t]hat’s what really drives the patchwork quilt. . . . Anyone 
would think that it’s quite oxymoronic that a solar energy plant could actually 
create or cause environmental degradation. [But t]hat’s what is happening.”174 
The California Energy Commission (CEC) has been called a “superagen-
cy”175 with respect to most energy development and regulation in California 
because its authority “supersede[s] any applicable statute, ordinance or regula-
tion of any state, local, or regional agency, or federal agency to the extent per-
mitted by federal law.”176 It has preemption power and exclusive jurisdiction 
over the development of all “thermal powerplant[s],”177 including “solar ther-
mal powerplants [sic]” (e.g., Ivanpah).178 However, it does not have such au-
thority or jurisdiction over “any wind, hydroelectric, or solar photovoltaic elec-
trical generating facility.”179 As such, most solar energy projects on state and/or 
private land in California are regulated primarily at the county level.180 
California has 58 counties, 482 incorporated cities, and 2,156 independent 
special districts.181 It is therefore not surprising that utility-scale solar projects 
in California may be subject to the jurisdiction of thirty or more regulatory enti-
ties across all levels of governance.182 This entanglement of overlapping au-
thorities implicates unique issues of federalism, a concept frequently discussed 
in terms of a government’s “vertical” and “horizontal” power structure. “Verti-
cal” refers to the hierarchy of governments in terms of authority and preemp-
tion power at each level of governance (e.g., federal, state, county, municipal), 
while “horizontal” refers to equality of governments within the same level of 
governance in terms of their authority (e.g., the authority of counties in relation 
to each other).183 However, the issue of jurisdiction over solar development in 
California (and the regulatory anticommons problem thereby implicated) re-
quires a more nuanced understanding of horizontal and vertical interactions 
                                                        
174  Lee, supra note 152. 
175  See DuVivier, supra note 156, at 191. 
176  CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25500 (West 2016). For a discussion of how citing authority is 
organized in other states, see generally Steven Ferrey, Siting Technology, Land-Use Ener-
gized, 66 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (2016). 
177  CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25120 (defining “thermal powerplant”); see also DuVivier, supra 
note 156, at 198–200. 
178  CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25140 (defining “solar thermal powerplant”); DuVivier, supra 
note 156, at 209. 
179  CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25120; DuVivier, supra note 156, at 199. 
180  DuVivier, supra note 156, at 199–200. 
181  INST. FOR LOCAL GOV’T, UNDERSTANDING THE BASICS OF MUNICIPAL REVENUES IN 
CALIFORNIA: CITIES, COUNTIES AND SPECIAL DISTRICTS 3 (2016). 
182  See DuVivier, supra note 156, at 202. 
183  See generally, e.g., Blake Hudson & Jonathan Rosenbloom, Uncommon Approaches to 
Commons Problems: Nested Governance Commons and Climate Change, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 
1273 (2013). 
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across levels and types of jurisdictions184 —an understanding which mirrors 
Heller’s discussion of the arrangement of exclusion rights in anticommons 
property.185 
Consider the hypothetical multijurisdictional project parcel described 
above: assume this project parcel crosses county lines and encompasses private, 
state, and federal lands. This project parcel will thus implicate all vertical levels 
of governance: at least two county governments, multiple municipal authorities, 
multiple state agencies, and multiple federal agencies.186 However, at least in 
the context of regulating solar energy development on this parcel, each of the 
government entities involved (across all vertical levels of governance) are func-
tionally horizontal in their regulatory capacities. In fact, there is no clear verti-
cal hierarchy of governance on this project parcel.187 Such an arrangement 
(horizontal interests without a decision-making hierarchy) is precisely what 
Heller discussed as the hallmark of anticommons property,188 and what Buzbee 
subsequently discussed as the hallmark of regulatory commons.189 However, 
while regulatory gaps are possible with respect to specific regulatory issues, 
this arrangement is fundamentally anticommons in nature. Consider, for in-
stance, CEQA and NEPA. 
Virtually all utility-scale energy development in California must comply 
with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).190 Generally speaking, 
CEQA requires the lead agency191 assigned to oversee the development of an 
energy project to conduct an extensive environmental review, publish an “envi-
ronmental impact report” (EIR),192 and hold public hearings before approving 
any project that “may cause a significant effect on the environment.”193 CEQA 
was modeled on NEPA,194 which imposes on federal agencies similar require-
                                                        
184  Id. at 1279–80, 1314–36; see also Bellantuono, supra note 37, at 332; Outka, supra note 
144, at 286–97. 
185  See Heller, supra note 27, at 667–70. 
186  See Wiseman et al., supra note 1, at 831–832, 903. 
187  See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 20, at 494, 505–509. 
188  See supra Section I.B.2. 
189  See supra text accompanying note 84; see also supra Section I.B.4. 
190  See generally California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000–
21189 (West 2016); Troxler, supra note 159, at 169, 172. 
191  Under CEQA, the lead entity can be either a state agency or a local government depend-
ing on the project. In the context of renewable-energy development, usually the lead regula-
tory entity that conducts the CEQA review for a particular renewable-energy project is the 
relevant county government. Troxler, supra note 159, at 172. 
192  See generally CEQA Procedures for Internal CDFW Actions, CAL. DEP’T OF FISH & 
WILDLIFE, https://www.wildlife.ca.gov/Conservation/CEQA/Procedures#792162-environ 
mental-impact-report [https://perma.cc/8XQE-SF53] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017); Chapter 36 
– Environmental Impact Report, CAL. DEP’T OF TRANSP. (June 21, 2016 11:34 AM) 
http://www.dot.ca.gov/ser/vol1/sec5/ch36eir/chap36.htm [https://perma.cc/ADF2-LPUV]. 
193  Troxler, supra note 159, at 170, 172–173. 
194  Frequently Asked Questions About CEQA, CAL. NAT. RESOURCES AGENCY, 
http://resources.ca.gov/ceqa/more/faq.html [https://perma.cc/HL83-6WDH] (last visited Oct. 
26, 2017). 
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ments, including (potentially) preparation of an “environmental impact” state-
ment (EIS).195 Both CEQA and NEPA are “painstaking process[es]”196: CEQA 
reviews take an average of 2.4 years,197 and NEPA reviews take an average of 
4.6 years.198 
CEQA and NEPA are substantially similar and primarily serve the same 
basic function: they both “essentially [ring] ‘an environmental alarm bell,’ de-
signed to alert the public and its responsible officials to environmental changes 
before they have reached ecological points of no return.’ ”199 However, unlike 
NEPA, which is an “ ‘essentially procedural’ overlay designed to inform, not 
direct, decisionmaking,”200 CEQA actually directs a lead agency’s substantive 
decisionmaking.201 If a project requires input from both federal and state agen-
cies, they may collaborate and/or rely on each other to complete just one envi-
ronmental impact analysis to satisfy both the requirements of NEPA and 
CEQA.202 However, because CEQA alone “dictate[s] that the least environmen-
tally harmful alternative be implemented,”203 an EIS that would otherwise satis-
fy the requirements of NEPA may not satisfy those of CEQA.204  
Thus, for a hypothetical solar-project parcel that encompasses both state 
and federal land, the project developer might be forced to wait for federal agen-
cies to comply with NEPA and then for state agencies to subsequently comply 
with CEQA’s additional requirements. The developer would be at the peril of 
the relevant state and federal agencies’ ability and willingness to collaborate 
“to the fullest extent possible to reduce duplication between [CEQA] and 
[NEPA].”205 Assuming state and federal agencies are able and willing to col-
laborate efficiently and effectively, the state agency may use the NEPA/CEQA 
                                                        
195  Troxler, supra note 159, at 172; see also Outka, supra note 144, at 262–64. 
196  Troxler, supra note 159, at 176; see also Outka, supra note 144, at 262–66. 
197  Troxler, supra note 159, at 180. Completing an EIR takes an average of 447.6 days. Id. at 
180–81. 
198  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 14-369, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
ACT: LITTLE INFORMATION EXISTS ON NEPA ANALYSES 13 (2014). 
199  Troxler, supra note 159, at 174 (citing Laurel Heights Improvement Ass’n v. Regents of 
Cal., 764 P.2d 278, 282 (Cal. 1988)). 
200  Outka, supra note 144, at 264 (citing Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. 
Council, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978)). 
201  E.g., Troxler, supra note 159, at 176; see also C. Aylin Bilir, Stopping the Runaway 
Train of CEQA Litigation: Proposals for Non-Judicial Substantive Review, 35 ENVIRONS 
145, 149–51 (2012). 
202  Bilir, supra note 201, at 148. See generally, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, §§ 15220–
15229 (2017). 
203  Sara Wimberger, Note, Consideration of Alternatives in Environmental Impact Reports: 
The Importance of CEQA’s Procedural Requirements, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 499, 516–17 
(2009). 
204  See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15221 (2017). 
205  See id. § 15226. See generally, e.g., Peter Maloney, California Solar Project Shot Down 
After Clearing Federal Environmental Permits, UTILITY DIVE (Aug. 26, 2016), 
http://www.utilitydive.com/news/california-solar-project-shot-down-after-clearing-federal-
environmental-per/425193 [https://perma.cc/53A4-N8K2]. 
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compliant EIS/EIR to impede development of the project206—all at the expense 
of the developer’s time and money.207 Beyond this risk, the developer of such a 
project would be exposed to the added uncertainty of at least two regulatory 
processes (state and federal) by which multiple agencies, and lawsuits by the 
public, can impede the project’s ultimate approval.208 Moreover, NEPA and 
CEQA represent just one instance of the regulatory anticommons for project 
parcels in California.209  
Development of a solar-project parcel subject to more than one primary ju-
risdiction is mostly hypothetical at present because such projects, at least those 
in the DRECP area, are virtually unheard of. Out of fifty-three total renewable 
projects of varying size and type (including solar, wind, and geothermal) in the 
DRECP plan area,210 only one project crossed county lines,211 and none encom-
passed both federal and state lands.212 This lack of multijurisdictional project 
parcels is the picture of renewable energy development at present: the picture 
of beams of useable and convertible solar energy striking parcels of solar pan-
els on project sites located within single primary jurisdictions—but, generally 
speaking, nowhere else.213 
This result is significant for two reasons. First, the primary-jurisdiction 
limitation on the number of feasible development sites may eventually lead to 
suboptimal solar development (i.e., at some point in the future demand for ad-
ditional solar projects may exceed the supply of project parcels available for 
development).214 Second, the primary-jurisdiction limitation results in a subop-
timal choice of land for development. In other words, it does not matter if de-
veloping a neighboring solar-project parcel would be better for the environment 
(in terms of endangered species, water etc.), better for the public (in terms of 
                                                        
206  See Bilir, supra note 201, at 151 (“[T]he political accountability rationale for CEQA’s 
structure breaks down when projects subject to CEQA apply across regions that may have 
divergent environmental values.”). 
207  See Troxler, supra note 159, at 175–79. 
208  See generally, e.g., Bilir, supra note 201; Troxler, supra note 159. 
209  See generally, e.g., Bellantuono, supra note 37, at 347–49; Kosnik, supra note 93, at 
380–81. Another example in this context includes the California Endangered Species 
(CESA), CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 2050–2116 (2013), and the Endangered Species Act 
of 1973 (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012). 
210  For additional information about this data, see generally infra note 250–51. 
211  See DRAFT DRECP, supra note 9, app. o at O-4. 
212  See id. at O-2 to O-5. 
213  See generally id.; Renewable Energy Projects Under Development, with Existing and 
Approved Transmission Lines, CAL. ENERGY COMMISSION (Dec. 24, 2015), 
http://www.energy.ca.gov/maps/renewable/renewable_development.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q4K2-REKP]. 
214  This statement reflects a qualitative inference. This author was unable to find any quanti-
tative analysis of the availability of acreage that is both feasible and economical for utility-
scale solar development and how the presence of multiple primary jurisdictions affects that 
baseline availability. The baseline data is readily available. See, e.g., DRAFT DRECP: 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 9, at 40. But data with which to discern the impact of the 
jurisdiction variable on that baseline has eluded this author. 
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conservation of natural and cultural resources etc.), and otherwise better for the 
developer (in terms of engineering challenges/costs, vicinity of existing trans-
mission infrastructure, etc.): if that neighboring parcel crosses primary jurisdic-
tions—and for no other reason—it will likely be the last to be developed.215  
The specter of regulatory-anticommons problems in California may be 
wreaking havoc on solar energy development in a different, subtler (even rather 
ironic), but no less significant way. The nearly exponential proliferation of 
overlapping secondary and tertiary216 jurisdictions as one moves closer to the 
center of urban areas may be driving solar energy developers as far into rural 
areas as feasibly possible—areas that are the most likely to be untouched by 
human development.217 Moreover, the closer a proposed solar project is to ur-
ban areas, the more neighbors it will likely have—neighbors who may not want 
a solar farm in their backyards.218 
Herein lies the cruelest tragedy of renewable-energy governance as it 
stands today: the apparent paradox that solar development may be doing more 
harm to the environment than good—a paradox apparent enough to give even 
the most ardent advocates of utility-scale solar development reason for 
pause.219 But whether solar development is going on in one’s own backyard or 
half a world away, a general principle will govern that development: Where 
there are anticommons clouds, there will likely be suboptimal choice of solar-
project parcels to develop; and where there is such suboptimal choice, there 
will likely be suboptimal outcomes. The issue, then, is how to address the anti-
commons clouds looming over the future of utility-scale solar. 
II. THE SOLUTION  
“The isolation and fragmentation of [renewable] energy planning and devel-
opment in the United States is a flaw that can no longer be ignored.”220 
Several solutions have been proposed to address anticommons concerns in 
various contexts.221 As described in Part I, the central characteristics of anti-
commons property are the presence of multiple owners, each with unilateral 
rights of exclusion, and the lack of a clear hierarchy of decisionmaking among 
those multiple owners.222 Thus, it follows that proposed solutions to anticom-
                                                        
215  See infra text accompanying note 296–98. But see infra note 300. 
216  Recall that California has 58 counties, 482 incorporated cities, and 2,156 independent 
special districts. INST. FOR LOCAL GOV’T, supra note 181, at 3. 
217  See Lee, supra note 152. 
218  Id. 
219  See, e.g., Imhoff, supra note 156, at 83–84; see also Wiseman, supra note 20, at 509–10; 
Warburg, supra note 15. See generally Logar, supra note 8, at 367–71. 
220  Wiseman, supra note 20, at 540. 
221  See HELLER, supra note 80, at 187–198 (2008); see also, e.g., Kosnik, supra note 93, at 
381–87; Wiseman, supra note 20, at 528–38. 
222  Dibadj, supra note 40, at 1049; Heller, supra note 27, at 670–73. See generally supra 
Section I.B.1. 
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mons-property concerns would tend to aim primarily at establishing a hierarchy 
of authority and/or reducing the number of owners in the anticommons proper-
ty.223  
Proposed solutions to regulatory-anticommons concerns parallel such log-
ic: if there are agencies with overlapping jurisdiction and no clear hierarchy 
governing their discordant, duplicative, and uncoordinated requirements, then it 
follows that reforms would be needed to either: 1) establish a lead supervisory 
agency and hierarchize the disparate regulatory entities; 2) eliminate or at least 
harmonize duplicative requirements by consolidating and/or standardizing the 
disparate regulations; and/or 3) coordinate the efforts of agencies with overlap-
ping jurisdiction.224 
A. The Options: All Roads Lead to Streamlining 
“The main lesson from the literature is that some sort of coordinating authority 
or streamlined institutional structure is required in order to encourage com-
munication and group outcomes. Otherwise, suboptimal regulatory outcomes 
are inevitable.”225 
Wiseman’s approach to reforming fragmented regulatory framework gov-
erning renewable-energy involves the creation of “regional energy board[s],”226 
what this Note calls “regional superagencies”227: independent agencies with 
broad authority to consolidate and/or coordinate the discordant and multitudi-
nous regulatory processes of local, state, regional, and federal agencies into a 
comprehensive and streamlined framework.228 Her solution would “creat[e] a 
defined area of governance, establish[] primary governing authority in one in-
stitution, and collect[] and streamlin[e] regulations within that institution.”229 
This approach can be roughly broken down into three basic overlapping com-
ponents: structural reform, organizational reform, and streamlining.230  
                                                        
223  See, e.g., HELLER, supra note 80, at 187–198. 
224  See generally Kosnik, supra note 93, at 381–84; Wiseman, supra note 20, at 528–34. 
225  Kosnik, supra note 93, at 381. 
226  See Wiseman, supra note 20, at 526–28. 
227  Compare Wiseman, supra note 20, at 528–34 (defining her “regional renewable govern-
ance” model), with DuVivier, supra note 156, at 198 (describing the “superagency solu-
tion”). 
228  See Wiseman, supra note 20, at 526–28. 
229  Id. at 527. 
230  Compare Wiseman, supra note 20, at 528–38, and Hybrid Energy Governance, supra 
note 146, at 4–10, with Kosnik, supra note 93, at 381–87, and Imhoff, supra note 156, at 93–
97. These overlapping components can also be considered distinct approaches. See Kosnik, 
supra note 93, at 381. 
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1.  Structural Reform: The Regional Superagency 
“Forgotten in th[e energy] fray is the fact that renewable energy resources in a 
majority of states have no comparable statewide agency to facilitate the siting 
and regulatory processes [governing solar energy development].”231 
Wiseman’s ideal solution first involves the creation of regional superagen-
cies to oversee renewable-energy development.232 This approach is primarily 
structural.233 According to Wiseman, to prove operationally effective, a region-
al superagency must first be an independent agency: one that “[does] not func-
tion within an existing federal, state, or municipal entity [or governance 
framework].”234 An ideal regional superagency would also require the power to 
establish a hierarchy of decision-making authority—with itself at the top, under 
which all relevant local, state, and federal agencies take direction to coordinate 
their regulatory processes and resolve interagency disputes.235 In other words, it 
must not be limited to serving merely an advisory role in its coordination of 
agencies and stakeholders within the hierarchy.236  
Additionally, a regional superagency would require the authority to unify 
and/or standardize the substantive requirements of vertically disparate local, 
state, and federal regulations into a cohesive top-down framework.237 An effec-
tive regional superagency would also require preemption powers—or an equiv-
alent authority (e.g., something akin to the structure of the Clean Air Act’s co-
operative-federalism framework)238—over all lower relevant local zoning 
codes, local ordinances, state laws, and state regulations.239 Such authority 
would be required to overrule any single dissenter, such as a local government 
or municipal entity, with either unfounded or purely NIMBY-based opposition 
to a solar energy project.240 For similar reasons, a regional superagency would 
also require final authority over project siting and approval of the construction 
of necessary electricity-transmission infrastructure.241 Beyond these require-
ments, an effective regional superagency must also adequately integrate pri-
vate-stakeholder and public interest participation within its decision-making 
                                                        
231  DuVivier, supra note 156, at 191. 
232  Wiseman, supra note 20, at 528. 
233  See Kosnik, supra note 93, at 382 (“The first possible type of reform would be to create a 
lead regulatory agency with primacy rights over [renewable-energy] management issues.”). 
Structural reform has also been called a “one-stop shop” approach. See, e.g., Wiseman, su-
pra note 20, at 526. 
234  Wiseman, supra note 20, at 528. 
235  Id. at 527–28, 530–31. 
236  Id. at 516–17. 
237  See id. at 528, 532; Wiseman et al., supra note 1, at 898–99. 
238  See Ross Cheit, The Energy Mobilization Board, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 727, 742–43 (1980). 
239  See Wiseman, supra note 20, at 531–32. 
240  See id. at 531. 
241  See id. at 514, 528, 530–31. 
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framework.242 The regional-superagency approach has several benefits and sev-
eral drawbacks,243 explored below.244  
2.  Organizational Reform: Last Agency Standing 
“Centralized, state-level siting authority could address all of the[] cost, exper-
tise, efficiency, and environmental concerns [associated with renewable-energy 
development].”245 
Structural reform is distinguishable from organizational reform in that 
structural reform leaves intact the existing regulatory rights holders and is 
therefore primarily procedural,246 whereas organizational reform aims to reduce 
the number of such rights holders by consolidating their authority in the single 
superagency.247 In other words, whereas structural reform creates a hierarchy of 
decision-making authority, organizational reform would eliminate the need for 
a hierarchy at all by taking authority from each of the various lower entities and 
consolidating such authority in the single superagency. True organizational re-
form is much more radical than structural reform and therefore highly unlikely 
in the renewable context—especially interstate and/or state-federal organiza-
tional reform.248 
3. Streamlining: Hybrid Regional Governance 
“It’s a [c]oordination [p]roblem.”249 
Although regional superagencies represent the ideal solution, Wiseman al-
so recognizes the importance of “hybrid institutions” as models for future re-
gional superagencies.250 “Hybrid [r]egional [g]overnance”251 would involve the 
                                                        
242  See, e.g., Hybrid Energy Governance, supra note 146, at 8–9. 
243  See generally, e.g., Kosnik, supra note 93, at 382–83; Wiseman, supra note 20, at 527–
30. 
244  See infra Section II.A.2. 
245  DuVivier, supra note 156, at 196. 
246  See Kosnik, supra note 93, at 383. Wiseman’s approach involves procedurally consoli-
dating the exercise of the exclusion-equivalent rights and interests of regional stakeholders 
under a central process led by the regional superagency. Wiseman, supra note 20, at 530. In 
other words, structural reform does not consolidate authority; it merely establishes a hierar-
chy of existing authority under the new lead superagency. See Kosnik, supra note 93, at 382; 
see also Wiseman, supra note 20, at 530. 
247  See Kosnik, supra note 93, at 383–84. 
248  See id. See generally Cheit, supra note 238, at 727. 
249  Kosnik, supra note 93, at 376. 
250  See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 MD. 
L. REV. 773, 818 (2013) [hereinafter Dynamic Energy Federalism]; Hybrid Energy Govern-
ance, supra note 146, at 4–5. However, according to Wiseman, hybrid institutions ultimately 
“cannot fully solve” the problems of regulatory anticommons associated with renewable-
energy development. Hybrid Energy Governance, supra note 146, at 61; Wiseman et al., su-
pra note 1, at 898–99; see also Wiseman, supra note 20, at 509–511. 
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cooperation and collaboration of agencies and actors from multiple levels of 
government through innovative relationships (what this Note calls “structural 
hybridity”) and innovative governance processes (what this Note calls “organi-
zational hybridity”).252 Such innovative governance relationships and processes 
are “hybrid” by virtue of their capacity to facilitate both vertical253 and horizon-
tal254 cooperation and collaboration between state, federal, and private stake-
holders involved in a complex regulatory framework.255  
Whereas the regional-superagency solution reflects, primarily, structural 
and organizational reforms to consolidate and unify regulatory authority and 
processes,256 hybrid institutions “help ameliorate the problem of inadequate 
[and fragmented] authority without requiring major legal [(i.e., organizational)] 
or institutional [(i.e., structural)] reform.”257 In other words, hybrid institutions 
attempt to resolve regulatory commons and anticommons problems without 
structurally hierarchizing authority and without organizationally reducing the 
number of agencies or regulatory processes by consolidating them.258 Rather, 
such hybrid institutions represent innovations within the existing regulatory 
framework—innovations which, in terms of novel relationships (structural hy-
bridity) and/or novel coordination efforts (organizational hybridity), serve to 
streamline disparate, fragmented, and/or overlapping regulatory processes and 
substantive requirements. Hybridity and streamlining are closing related con-
cepts. 
 “Streamlining” carries at least two distinct meanings in the context of re-
newable-energy development.259 However, Wiseman explicitly rejects “stream-
lining” as it is used to describe “fast tracking” and the regulatory approach it 
embodies.260 Rather, Wiseman uses the term “streamlining” to refer to “a com-
                                                                                                                                 
251  Hybrid Energy Governance, supra note 146, at 5 (emphasis omitted). 
252  See id. at 4. 
253  “Vertical,” here, refers to up-and-down interactions between different levels of govern-
ance. Dynamic Energy Federalism, supra note 250, at 815–20. 
254  “Horizontal,” here, refers to side-to-side interactions across the same level of govern-
ance. Id. at 820–24. 
255  See id. at 812–24; Hybrid Energy Governance, supra note 146, at 5–6, 61–62. 
256  Compare Wiseman, supra note 20, at 528–38, with Kosnik, supra note 93, at 381–84. 
257  Hybrid Energy Governance, supra note 146, at 61–62; see also Dynamic Energy Feder-
alism, supra note 250, at 812–24. 
258  Kosnik, supra note 93, at 387. 
259  First, it is often used as a synonym for “expediting” and “fast-tracking,” both of which 
refer to, in general terms, the priority review of certain projects and an agency’s performance 
of certain regulatory requirements on a wide (generally called “programmatic”) scale in ad-
vance of individual project applications being filed and reviewed—the combined effect of 
which is to shorten the review and approval process for particular types of projects. See gen-
erally Logar, supra note 8. 
260  See Wiseman et al., supra note 1, at 898. Wiseman disagrees with expedited review to 
the extent that regulatory process becomes hasty and places value merely on speed at the ex-
pense of essential regulatory requirements, however cumbersome, that serve important socie-
tal goals, values, and concerns. See id. at 898–99; see also Wiseman, supra note 20, at 509–
10. Wiseman’s definition of streamlining is not always the same as the DRECP’s. As used 
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prehensive state-wide or regional regime that collects all localized zoning rights 
and state permitting and review requirements within one process.”261  
One may reconcile the unobvious difference between Wiseman’s definition 
of streamlining and the definitions of structural and organizational reform by 
first thinking of streamlining as the (highly likely) result of ideal structural and 
organizational reform.262 However, streamlining is distinguishable from both 
structural and organizational reform because streamlining can be accomplished 
without structural or organizational reform. The dispositive feature of stream-
lining is not consolidation, but rather harmonization: streamlining harmonizes 
and standardizes disparate regulations through collaboration without necessari-
ly consolidating or hierarchizing them.263  
More specifically, an ideal governance framework based on institutional 
hybridity would facilitate four objectives. First, the network of agencies with 
overlapping jurisdiction should involve some form of structural hybridity in 
forming an interagency panel to serve as an informal central hub for developers 
attempting to navigate the complex regulatory processes and various substance 
requirements of each member jurisdiction.264 This central hub should serve as 
the face of the network of agencies and thereby provide developers with a 
“one-stop shop” point of communication and source of comprehensive applica-
tion information pertaining to all the requirements of the relevant agencies and 
entities. 265 Second, this informal central hub should serve as the principal point 
of vertical and horizontal interagency coordination and communication.266 The 
informal hub should initiate and coordinate the requisite reviews of the dispar-
ate agencies involved in the project, and it should so as early in the project-
planning process as possible.267 Third, the central hub should integrate process-
es for collaborating with and obtaining feedback from private stakeholders and 
public-interest groups within the coordinated network of regulatory deci-
sionmaking.268 Lastly, as discussed below, hybridity-based efforts to streamline 
                                                                                                                                 
by the BLM and in DRECP documents, “streamlining” sometimes is used to refer to fast-
track/expedited approval for proposed renewable-energy development in pre-screened zones 
(called “Development Focus Areas”) of BLM-administered lands. See, e.g., DRAFT DRECP: 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 9, at 24; DRECP LUPA, supra note 11, at 11. See gener-
ally discussion in infra Section II.B.3. Thus, for clarity, this Note refers to the DRECP’s use 
of the word streamlining in this context exclusively as “fast tracking” or “expediting.” 
261  Wiseman et al., supra note 1, at 898. 
262  See generally, supra Sections II.A.1–2. 
263  See Kosnik, supra note 93, at 381, 384. 
264  Imhoff, supra note 156, at 93–94; see Wiseman et al., supra note 1, at 898–99. 
265  See Wiseman, supra note 20, at 525–26, 530–31; Imhoff, supra note 156, at 93–94; see 
also Kosnik, supra note 93, at 384–87; Wiseman et al., supra note 1, at 898–99. 
266  See, e.g., Imhoff, supra note 156, at 93–94. 
267  Id. at 94–95. 
268  See Hybrid Energy Governance, supra note 146, at 8–9; Imhoff, supra note 156, at 95–
96. 
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regional regulatory processes can and should include a dispute resolution pro-
cedure for managing both vertical and horizontal interagency disagreements.269  
4. Defining Effective Renewable Governance 
“[O]ne must of course have a definition of success.”270 
In theory, such a comprehensive framework of institutional hybridity for 
regulating solar energy development should increase agency efficiency, reduce 
regulatory delays, and prevent agencies and private parties with exclusion-
equivalent rights in the approval process from unilaterally holding up renewa-
ble-project development without good cause.271 It would accomplish these ob-
jectives by informally organizing, standardizing, and coordinating (i.e., 
“streamlining”) the many regulatory processes and requirements imposed by 
agencies and entities across all levels of government involved in regulating 
most solar energy projects. The hybrid-institution approach, though perhaps ul-
timately less ideal, at least avoids many of the political, legal, and bureaucratic 
challenges in creating regional superagencies, which would require true institu-
tional and perhaps even organization reform to satisfy Wiseman’s governance 
criteria.272 
 Evaluating the success of any governance framework involves three prin-
cipal qualitative inquiries: 1) whether the reform has the potential to reduce in-
efficiency, delay, and uncertainty in the regulatory process for solar energy de-
velopers;273 2) whether the reform fills regulatory gaps and addresses regulatory 
overlaps without creating new regulatory gaps and overlaps;274 and 3) whether 
the framework is innovative in terms of hybridity and regionalism.275 The suc-
cess of a specific instance of institutional hybridity should be based on a hand-
ful of considerations: whether it effectively harmonizes regulatory processes 
across levels of governance; whether it facilitates interagency collaboration, 
cooperation, and communication in addressing the problems of regulatory 
fragmentation and overlapping jurisdiction; and whether it provides for the in-
                                                        
269  See Hybrid Energy Governance, supra note 146, at 24–31; Imhoff, supra note 156, at 
93–94; see also Heller, supra note 27, at 670 (“An object is held as anticommons property if 
[each of its multiple owners holds a core right in the property], with no hierarchy among the-
se owners’ rights or clear rules for conflict resolution.”). 
270  Hybrid Energy Governance, supra note 146, at 56. 
271  Imhoff, supra note 156, at 93; see also Wiseman, supra note 20, at 527–528. See gener-
ally supra Section I.D. 
272  See generally Kosnik, supra note 93, at 381–82. 
273  Id. at 381; Imhoff, supra note 156, at 85–87; see Wiseman, supra note 20, at 509–511. 
274  See Wiseman, supra note 20, at 509–511; Wiseman et al., supra note 1, at 898–99. 
275  See Hybrid Energy Governance, supra note 146, at 56 (“[T]here is arguably value in hav-
ing a better energy governance process even if the outcomes remain the same.”). See gener-
ally discussion supra Section II.A. 
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volvement of private and public stakeholders in the regulatory and governance 
process.276 
B. The DRECP: 10,000 Pages; 12,000 Comments; A Few Basic Questions277 
1.  What is it? 
“[T]he most ambitious and innovative planning effort undertaken in the Cali-
fornia desert[:] it strikes the right balance between the protection of critical 
desert resources and the responsible development of much-needed renewable 
energy—not an easy feat by any measure.”278 
In general terms, the DRECP (“Plan”) is an interagency, intergovernmental 
collaboration designed to facilitate utility-scale renewable development in an 
expansive region of desert in southern California while protecting the region’s 
desert ecosystems and conserving the region’s recreational, cultural, and natu-
ral resources.279 Home to “an abundance of some of the best solar, wind, and 
geothermal resources in the nation,” the Plan area spans seven local counties 
and covers approximately 22,585,000 acres of both federal, state, and private 
lands across California’s Mojave and Colorado/Sonoran Deserts.280 The region 
is home to rich biological diversity,281 a “robust cultural heritage,” and a variety 
of economic and social interests.282 As such, the multijurisdictional Plan area 
presents significant economic opportunities and considerable regulatory hurdles 
for prospective renewable energy developers. The DRECP is a comprehensive 
regulatory framework tailored to the unique multiplicity of opportunities, chal-
lenges, jurisdictions, and interests the Plan area represents. It aims to achieve, 
as a quantitative benchmark, a combined capacity of twenty thousand mega-
watts283 from renewable energy facilities in the Plan area.284 To achieve that 
                                                        
276  See Hybrid Energy Governance, supra note 146, at 9–12; see also Kosnik, supra note 93, 
at 382, 384; Imhoff, supra note 156, at 94–95. 
277  See Sammy Roth, County Governments Criticize Renewable Energy Plan, DESERT SUN 
(Feb. 26, 2015, 5:49 PM), http://www.desertsun.com/story/tech/science/energy/2015/02/26/ 
county-governments-criticize-renewable-energy-plan/24092121 [https://perma.cc/XQQ9-
VRN7]. 
278  O’Shea & Cavanagh, supra note 13. 
279  DRAFT DRECP: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 9, at 6. 
280  Id. at 6, 7; see also Cal. Energy Comm’n, supra note 12. 
281  For a description of California’s desert ecosystems, see generally ELNA S. BAKKER, AN 
ISLAND CALLED CALIFORNIA 285–344 (2d ed. 1984). 
282  DRAFT DRECP: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 9, at 6. 
283  For comparison, the Ivanpah facility has a capacity of roughly 400 megawatts (MW). See 
Ivanpah Project Facts, supra note 29. Thus, the DRECP’s benchmark roughly equates to a 
net capacity of 50 Ivanpah facilities. The state of Nevada requires roughly 10,000 MW (to-
tal) of capacity in the summer. Nevada Electricity Profile 2015, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 
(Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/state/Nevada [https://perma.cc/X8TG-
C84X]. Thus, if fully developed, the DRECP region could power roughly two Nevadas. By 
contrast, California requires roughly 75,000 MW (total). California Electricity Profile 2015, 
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goal, the DRECP includes several policy objectives, only one of which this 
Note considers: to coordinate county, state, and federal permitting procedures 
for renewable-energy projects.285  
2.  How does it work? 
In more specific terms, the DRECP is a document (“Draft DRECP”), the 
import of which is perhaps best understood by way of analogy: The Draft 
DRECP is a sort of Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) for renewable energy 
development (and conservation) in the Plan area.286 First, it has no legal effect 
in a particular jurisdiction until the jurisdiction formally adopts it as law. Se-
                                                                                                                                 
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Jan. 17, 2017), http://www.eia.gov/electricity/state/California 
[https://perma.cc/T8GH-4SAB]. 
284  DRAFT DRECP: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 9, at 14, 16. 
285  See id. at 7. 
286  As discussed below, the Draft DRECP contains multiple disparate components to address 
the many goals embodied in the document. However, the general theme in each of these 
components is an interjurisdictional approach/solution. For instance, the Draft DRECP in-
cludes a draft EIR/EIS that would satisfy the requirements of both NEPA and CESA. See 3 
DRAFT DRECP, supra note 147, at III.1-5 to 1-6 (“The ‘affected environment’ (NEPA) and 
‘environmental setting’ (CEQA) together make up the environmental baseline used to de-
termine the effects of the Plan. The environmental baseline is the same for both NEPA and 
CEQA.”); 4 id. at IV.1-2 (“This document describes, in general, potential environmental, 
economic, and social effects of the Plan. The discussion of cumulative and growth-inducing 
impacts is also general and corresponds to the level of analysis of a Programmatic EIR/EIS. 
Proposed mitigation strategies that can be applied in future tiered projects address significant 
adverse environmental consequences. However, the precise impacts of individual projects 
cannot readily be identified at this early planning stage; supplemental CEQA and NEPA 
documents will be prepared to address project-specific analyses when additional information 
on specific proposed projects is available. This document has been prepared to comply with 
both CEQA and NEPA. Both laws require the analysis of environmental impacts of the Plan. 
This analysis can be approached the same way for both laws, but each law requires that cer-
tain issues be specifically addressed. Both CEQA and NEPA are designed to identify signifi-
cant environmental impacts; however, they have slightly different definitions and approaches 
to determining significance.”). In a different sense, the DRECP is something like the U.C.C. 
(AM. LAW. INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2005), in that the 
Draft DRECP is intended to serve as a model for the standardization (albeit for primarily 
conservation purposes) of law/codes at the local/county level of governance. See DRAFT 
DRECP: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 9, at 9 (“After the DRECP is finalized, a local 
government could elect to prepare its own NCCP and/or apply directly for incidental take 
under the GCP. The local government would have flexibility to prepare a plan that covers 
not just renewable energy projects, but also other private development and public infrastruc-
ture projects. The local government would also have flexibility to define appropriate devel-
opment areas for renewable energy projects and appropriate conservation areas for species 
covered by the DRECP, provided the local government’s plan is consistent with the 
DRECP’s Biological Goals and Objectives and mitigation requirements (i.e., that it tiers 
from the DRECP). Instead of or in addition to participating directly in the implementation of 
the DRECP, local governments could choose to use the DRECP for other purposes, such as 
developing land use plans or policies, developing local requirements for renewable energy 
projects, identifying conservation priorities, identifying sensitive habitat areas, or identifying 
appropriate mitigation areas for the impacts of locally approved projects.”). 
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cond, its purpose (uniformity of law across jurisdictions) is thwarted to the ex-
tent that it is not formally adopted by all relevant jurisdictions. In other words, 
the Draft DRECP is a document that, as a master key and “one size fits all” so-
lution, will standardize (to an extent) many of the disparate laws and regulatory 
requirements of jurisdictions with either overlapping or fragmented authority 
over renewable development in the Plan area. However, the Draft DRECP is 
little more than a document to the extent that the relevant jurisdictions fail to 
formally adopt it. 
As such, the DRECP can roughly be broken down, first, into two imple-
mentation phases: Phase I, which pertains exclusively to the BLM and the fed-
eral lands across the Plan area over which the BLM has primary jurisdiction; 
and Phase 2, which pertains much more broadly to the counties and agencies 
(both state and federal)287 with varying levels of jurisdiction over federal, state, 
and/or private lands in the Plan Area.288 Second, it can roughly be broken down 
into three planning/spatial components: first, the BLM’s DRECP LUPA, which 
applies to over ten million acres of BLM-administered lands;289 second, the 
USFW’s “General Conservation Plan” (GCP),290 which would apply to nearly 
five and a half million acres of state and private lands; and, third, the CDFW’s 
Natural Community Conservation Plan (“NCCP”),291 which would apply to the 
entire Plan area.292 A technical discussion of the latter two components is be-
yond the scope of this Note. 
The BLM completed Phase I in September 2016 by promulgating the 
DRECP LUPA, which amended various already-existing land-use designations 
and land-use plans for BLM-administered lands within the Plan area.293 The 
LUPA is, generally speaking, neither an inter-jurisdictional nor an interagency 
effort: it is managed solely by the BLM and applies exclusively to renewable 
development on certain federal lands within the DRECP area.294 The LUPA 
                                                        
287  See generally discussion infra Section II.B.3.a. 
288  E.g., U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., DESERT RENEWABLE ENERGY CONSERVATION PLAN: 
RECORD OF DECISION FOR THE LAND USE PLAN AMENDMENT TO THE CALIFORNIA DESERT 
CONSERVATION PLAN, BISHOP RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN, AND BAKERSFIELD RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT PLAN (Sept. 2016), http://drecp.org/finaldrecp/rod/DRECP_BLM_LUPA_ 
ROD.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CC2-GSMG] [hereinafter LUPA ROD]. 
289  DRECP LUPA, supra note 11, at 12. 
290  See generally Memorandum from Dir. of U.S. Dep’t of the Interior Fish and Wildlife 
Serv. to the Assistant Reg’l Dirs., Regions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, & 7, & Manager, Cal./Nev. Opera-
tions Office (Oct. 5, 2007), https://www.fws.gov/policy/m0369.pdf [https://perma.cc/UA6H-
HNVN]; see also, generally, Cal. Energy Comm’n, General Conservation Plan, DRECP, 
www.drecp.org/factsheets/archive/General_Conservation_Plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BUY-
9SCU] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017). 
291  See generally CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2069 (West 2013). 
292  E.g., DRAFT DRECP: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 9, at 9. 
293  See LUPA ROD, supra note 288, at 1; see also DRECP LUPA, supra note 11, at xi, xvii–
iii. 
294  See, e.g., DRECP LUPA, supra note 11, at 1. The BLM LUPA also applies to some non-
DRECP federal land on the periphery of the DRECP Plan area. See, e.g., id. at 1, 5 fig.2. 
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was based upon already-existing regional management policies in the BLM’s 
Western Solar Plan,295 which covers solar energy development on federal lands 
across Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah.296 The 
LUPA adopted the general land-management strategy of the broader Western 
Solar Plan but narrowly tailored it to be more specific to the DRECP region.297  
The BLM’s LUPA establishes five major categories of federal lands in the 
DRECP plan area: “Development Focus Areas (DFAs), Variance Process 
Lands (VPLs), General Public Lands, BLM Conservation Areas, and BLM 
Recreation Areas.”298 This Subsection will briefly address only LUPA DFAs,299 
primarily because “the BLM [has] adopt[ed] a variety of incentives to steer fu-
ture renewable energy development to the DFAs,”300 which the BLM has iden-
tified as the best areas for renewable development with the least potential for 
negative environmental impacts.301  
LUPA DFAs collectively cover about 388,000 acres of federal lands in the 
Plan area302—lands which the BLM has prescreened as the best sites for renew-
able development in terms of various factors, including availability of renewa-
ble resources, suitability for large-scale infrastructure, and potential that such 
infrastructure will disturb wildlife.303 DFAs are similar to, and based upon, the 
                                                        
295  DRECP LUPA, supra note 11, at 65. See generally U.S. BUREAU LAND MGMT.: SOLAR 
ENERGY PROGRAM, http://blmsolar.anl.gov/ [https://perma.cc/6K62-JS3C] (last visited Oct. 
26, 2017); see also, generally, U.S. Bureau of Land Management & U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 
EIS-0403: Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, ENERGY.GOV: OFF. NEPA 
POL’Y & COMPLIANCE, https://energy.gov/nepa/downloads/eis-0403-final-programmatic-
environmental-impact-statement [https://perma.cc/P7TE-WPZM] (last visited Oct. 26, 2017) 
[hereinafter Solar PEIS]; Final Solar Energy Development Programmatic Environmental 
Impact Statement (Solar PEIS), SOLAR ENERGY DEV. PROGRAMMATIC EIS INFO. CTR., 
http://solareis.anl.gov/documents/fpeis/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/YBD7-Z6ER] (last visit-
ed Oct. 26, 2017). 
296  E.g., U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, APPROVED RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN 
AMENDMENTS/RECORD OF DECISION (ROD) FOR SOLAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN SIX 
SOUTHWESTERN STATES 17 (Oct. 2012), http://solareis.anl.gov/documents/docs/Solar_PEIS_ 
ROD.pdf [https://perma.cc/XZ9G-QZEG]. 
297  See DRECP LUPA, supra note 11, at 11, 65. The LUPA, however, applies to all renewa-
bles, including wind and geothermal. See id. at 11–12. 
298  Id. at 11. 
299  For the sake of clarity and simplicity, this Note limits its discussion of DRECP DFAs to 
LUPA DFAs. LUPA DFAs are a specific subset of the more general category of DRECP 
DFAs, which includes DFAs on state and private lands. See DRAFT DRECP: EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY, supra note 9, at 40 tbl.7. 
300  DRECP LUPA, supra note 11, at 60. See generally id. at 61–64 tbl.13 (listing incentives 
for development within DFAs). 
301  See, e.g., LUPA ROD, supra note 288, at 25–26. 
302  E.g., DRECP LUPA, supra note 11, at 56 tbl.11 (providing distribution of DFA acreage 
by county and technology). 
303  See DRECP LUPA, supra note 11, at xiii, 11; LUPA ROD, supra note 288, at 25–28; see 
also NEW ENERGY FRONTIER, supra note 4, at 15. But see, e.g., Roth, supra note 161 (citing 
Sammy Roth, Wind Energy Faces Turbulent Future in Desert, DESERT SUN (Nov. 24, 2014), 
http://www.desertsun.com/story/money/2014/11/24/drecp-hurt-windmill-
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Western Solar Plan’s “Solar Energy Zones” (SEZs).304 The BLM offers numer-
ous significant incentives to develop these areas—including facilitated permit-
ting for transmission infrastructure,305 various economic incentives,306 and, 
most significantly, an expedited permitting/review process307 and NEPA tier-
ing.308  
3. What does it change? (Hybrid Governance in the DRECP) 
a.  Structural Hybridity in REAT 
The principal state and federal agencies implementing the Plan are the Cal-
ifornia Energy Commission (CEC), the California Department of Fish and 
Wildlife (CDFW), the BLM, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
(USFWS).309 These principal agencies, along with various other state and fed-
eral agencies, comprise an innovative hybrid-governance framework called the 
Renewable Energy Action Team (REAT).310 REAT is not a new, independent 
agency; rather, it is a network of disparate, already-existing agencies—each of 
which maintains its independent and substantive pre-REAT regulatory role, au-
thority, and jurisdiction over the fragmented Plan area.311 Through this net-
work, REAT agencies coordinate their respective efforts in implementing the 
DRECP by, for instance, maintaining regular interagency communications and 
integrated databases of DRECP-pertinent information, resolving interagency 
disagreements through a unique dispute resolution procedure, and reviewing 
                                                                                                                                 
developments/70059056 [https://perma.cc/84DF-EU9L] (explaining that critics of the 
DRECP says the Plan precludes development on the best lands for wind-energy develop-
ment). 
304  See DRECP LUPA, supra note 11, at 60. See generally Logar, supra note 8, at 376–382 
(discussing SEZs and DFAs). 
305  DRECP LUPA, supra note 11, at 62 tbl.13. 
306  See id. at 62–63 tbl.13. 
307  See id. at 59, 61 tbl.13; see also DRAFT DRECP: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 9, at 
24 exhibit 4 (providing a visual summary of the expedited review process for projects within 
DFAs); Logar, supra note 8, at 380 n.102 (quoting 2 DRAFT DRECP, supra note 147, at II.2-
17 (Aug. 2014) (Description and Comparative Analysis of Draft DRECP Alternatives)  
[hereinafter DRAFT DRECP VOL. II]). 
308  DRECP LUPA, supra note 11, at 59. See generally discussion infra Section II.B.3.b.ii. 
309  DRAFT DRECP: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 9, at 6. 
310  Cal. Energy Comm’n, Reat, DRECP, http://drecp.org/participants [https://perma.cc/VW 
H2-WYHJ] (last visited Oct. 27, 2017). 
311  See generally Planning Agreement by and Among California Department of Fish and 
Game, California Energy Commission, United States Bureau of Land Management, and 
United States Fish and Wildlife Service for the Desert Renewable Energy Conservation Plan 
(May 2010), http://www.energy.ca.gov/2009publications/REAT-1000-2009-034/REAT-
1000-2009-034-F.PDF [https://perma.cc/B8UP-WAP7] [hereinafter REAT Planning Agree-
ment]. 
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project proposals, sharing pertinent DRECP-project documents, and coordinat-
ing project timelines.312 
i.  Hybrid Hierarchy: A Pyramid of Coordination 
Although the DRECP does not create a new lead agency with broad con-
solidated authority, it does incorporate structural hybridity into its innovative 
regulatory approach. The proposed DRECP Implementation Agreement by 
REAT agencies would create several hybrid institutions, including the DRECP 
Executive Policy Group (Policy Group), the DRECP Coordination Group (Co-
ordination Group), and several “Working Groups.”313  
 The Policy Group would be responsible for coordinating interagency mat-
ters related to the DRECP’s big picture.314 It would be composed of several 
state and federal agency representatives, including a senior representative des-
ignated by the Governor of California, a senior representative designated by the 
Secretary of the Interior, the California Direct of the BLM, the Regional Direc-
tor of the USFWS, a CEC Commissioner, the Director of the CDFW, and the 
Executive Officer of the California State Lands Commission.315 The Policy 
Group would set big-picture interagency policy objectives, coordinate REAT 
agencies vertically and horizontally, and serve as the highest level of arbitral 
authority in the DRECP’s interagency dispute resolution framework.316 
 The Coordination Group would be responsible for managing interagency 
matters related to the DRECP’s day-to-day implementation.317 It would be 
composed of several state and federal agency representatives, initially including 
representatives of the principal REAT agencies.318 The Coordination Group 
would also include additional representatives from local governments to the ex-
tent that such governments cooperate with the DRECP by, inter alia, adopting 
mitigation and conservation plans that “tier” from the DRECP.319 The Coordi-
nation Group would oversee the implementation of the Policy Group’s big-
                                                        
312  Draft Memorandum of Understanding by and Between the Bureau of Land Management, 
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the California Energy Commission, and the California 
Department of Fish and Wildlife Regarding Collaboration and Partnership in Implementing 
the Desert Renewable Energy Conservation Plan 2–4, http://drecp.org/draftdrecp/documents/ 
Draft_DRECP_Implementation_MOU.pdf [https://perma.cc/YT96-SPVJ] [hereinafter Draft 
Implementation MOU]; see also Implementing Agreement for the Desert Renewable Energy 
Conservation Plan 8-10 (Dec. 23, 2014), http://drecp.org/draftdrecp/documents/Draft_ 
DRECP_NCCP_Implementation_Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/M24B-7WAD] [hereinaf-
ter Draft Implementation Agreement]; infra Section II.B.3.a.ii. 
313  Draft Implementation Agreement, supra note 312, at 8–9; see also DRAFT DRECP VOL. 
II, supra note 307, at II.3-103, http://drecp.org/draftdrecp/files/c_Volume_II/II.3_Preferred_ 
Alternative.pdf [https://perma.cc/GL67-WZQU]. 
314  See generally DRAFT DRECP VOL. II, supra note 307, at II.3-211–13. 
315  Id. at II.3-212. 
316  See id. 
317  See generally id. at II.3-213. 
318  Id. at II.3-213. 
319  Id. 
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picture objectives and coordinate REAT-agency actions and matters.320 The 
Implementation Agreement would also create a Program Manager, who would 
answer to the Coordination Group and manage Coordination Group staff in an 
advisory role.321  
 The Implementation Agreement would also incorporate input from various 
public, private, and government interests into the decision-making process 
through several Working Groups, including the Public Agency Working Group, 
the Stakeholder Working Group, and the Stakeholder Science Subgroup.322 The 
Public Agency Working Group would incorporate government-interest input 
from representatives of numerous extra-REAT state and federal agencies, in-
cluding the U.S. Environmental Protection Service, the National Park Service, 
the California Public Utilities Commission, the California Department of Con-
servation, and local governments.323 The Stakeholder Working Group would 
incorporate public- and private-interest input from representatives of, inter alia, 
the general public living in the Plan area, renewable energy industries, and en-
vironmental organizations.324 The Stakeholder Working Group would also in-
clude the Stakeholder Science Subgroup, a panel of scientists and technical ex-
perts who would provide expertise to be incorporated into the Coordination 
Group’s recommendations.325 
ii.  Hybrid Dispute Resolution: Interagency Arbitration 
The Draft Implementation Agreement would also create a unique dispute 
resolution mechanism to streamline the permitting process by preventing uni-
lateral administrative holdups.326 This dispute resolution mechanism would im-
plicate both vertical and horizontal hybridity by including multiple levels of au-
thority in resolving interagency issues. The level at which the issue is reviewed 
depends on the agencies involved and the level at which the dispute arises. 
Each level of review offers a range of state and federal agency representatives 
who, either individually or in any combination as appropriate, review the dis-
pute at that level.327  
At the lowest level, issues are resolved by any appropriate combination of 
the following: the BLM Field Office Manage, the USFWS Assistant Field Su-
pervisor, the CEC Project Manager, and/or the CDFW Environmental Program 
                                                        
320  Id. at II.3-213–14. 
321  DRAFT IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENT, supra note 312, at 9; see also DRAFT DRECP VOL. 
II, supra note 307, at II.3-215. 
322  DRAFT IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENT, supra note 312, at 9; see also DRAFT DRECP VOL. 
II, supra note 307, at II.3-218–19. 
323  DRAFT DRECP VOL. II, supra note 307, at II.3-218. 
324  Id. at II.3-219. 
325  Id. 
326  See Draft Implementation MOU, supra note 312, at 3. 
327  See id. at 4. 
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Manager.328 If the dispute cannot be resolved at that level, then it goes to the 
second level by any appropriate combination of the following: the BLM Dis-
trict Manager; the USFWS Field Supervisor; the CEC Deputy Director for the 
Division of Siting, Transmission, and Environmental Protection; and/or the 
CDFW Regional Manager.329 The final level involves the members of the 
DRECP Executive Policy Group: the BLM State Director, the USFWS Region-
al Director, the CEC Executive Direct, and the CDFW Director.330 The DRECP 
Coordination Group could intervene to resolve an issue at any level.331 
iii.  A Hybrid One-Stop Shop 
Although California’s CEC provides developers with a one-stop shop for 
complying with all permitting requirements for solar thermal power plants, 
there is no such one-stop shop for utility-scale facilities relying on wind tur-
bines or PV solar panels.332 The DRECP does little to change this, but the draft 
DRECP Implementation Agreement would create the Coordination Group and 
delegate to it a responsibility akin to the CEC’s one-stop shop responsibilities 
in regulating thermal power plants: to streamline permitting for projects in the 
DRECP plan area, the Coordination Group would accept project proposals for 
development on any site in the DRECP area and informally review them before 
the formal application and permitting process begins.333  
iv.  Evaluating REAT’s Structural Hybridity 
This structural framework exhibits unique horizontal and vertical hybridity 
in its attempt to prevent some of the anticommons concerns associated with re-
newable development. By administratively internalizing the coordination of 
agency efforts and the resolution of interagency disputes, this approach would, 
in theory, accomplish the same objective as would Wiseman’s superagency ap-
proach: eliminating unilateral holdouts by agencies with exclusion-equivalent 
rights and interests in the project-parcel development process, while (more or 
less) combining disparate regulatory processes into something more coherent 
and unified.334 
The project proposal feature of the Draft Implementation Agreement would 
offer multiple benefits. First, developers would feel less overwhelmed by the 
various and multitudinous regulatory processes by having a single entity with 
which to communicate.335 Second, it would provide the developer with feed-
back on what additional steps it would need to take and what additional infor-
                                                        
328  Id. 
329  Id. 
330  Id. 
331  Id. 
332  See discussion supra Section I.D.3. 
333  See Draft Implementation Agreement, supra note 312, at 13. 
334  See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 20, at 530–34. 
335  Imhoff, supra note 156, at 94. 
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mation it would need to gather throughout the various permitting processes.336 
Third, a project proposal would alert the Coordination Group of new projects to 
help it coordinate, in advance, the agencies the project would involve.337 
Fourth, as an incentivize for developers to utilize this option, submitting a pro-
ject proposal would trigger streamlining benefits once the application is submit-
ted to the relevant regulatory agencies—including priority status for environ-
mental reviews under CEQA and/or NEPA to be completed by relevant 
agencies within a guaranteed timeframe of one year.338 This incentive benefits 
agencies (in terms of administrative efficiency) and developers (in terms of less 
uncertainty) by triggering coordinated environmental review as early as possi-
ble in the application process.339 
 The project proposal and dispute resolution process of the Draft DRECP 
Implementation Agreement are worthy of emulation by future regional renewa-
ble energy superagencies and hybrid institutions. Although both mechanisms 
rely on cooperation and not substantive reallocation and consolidation of au-
thority, even a regional superagency could use such informal methods to estab-
lish a regulatory process more inclusive of public, private, local, and interagen-
cy interests. The informal project proposal mechanism could be extended to 
include an informal comment period. Once a project proposal is reviewed, but 
before the formal application process begins, the project proposal could be 
made public, and the superagency could allow for a similar informal comment 
period. Such informal comments would facilitate the superagency’s under-
standing of local and regional concerns and viewpoints much earlier on in the 
process, and it would help the superagency direct relevant agencies and the de-
veloper to address concerns much earlier in the formal regulatory process.340 
 Additionally, a dispute resolution procedure could extend beyond inter-
agency disputes to provide a forum for citizens to voice noteworthy local and 
regional concerns directly to developers.341 At a minimum, this procedure 
would benefit all parties by increasing the amount and quality of information 
and perspective available. Such a resolution process might also be useful for 
facilitating constructive negotiations between developers and private-land own-
ers after private negotiations reach an impasse.342 Especially in the case of re-
gional superagencies—which inherently run the risk of favoring developers and 
regional concerns at the expense of local voices and concerns343—informal dis-
pute resolution forums would lead to more informed decisions by agencies, bet-
ter siting and permitting outcomes for developers, less resentment by locals im-
                                                        
336  See id. 
337  See id. 
338  Draft Implementation Agreement, supra note 318, at 13. 
339  See Imhoff, supra note 156, at 94–95. 
340  See generally Imhoff, supra note 156, at 94–96. 
341  See Imhoff, supra note 156, at 95–96. 
342  See generally Logar, supra note 8. 
343  See Bellantuono, supra note 37, at 331. 
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pacted by development, and fewer lawsuits over disagreements between all in-
volved parties.344 
b. Organizational Hybridity in the DRECP 
 Some minimal level of standardization is required both to lessen uncertain-
ty for developers who may be considering several siting options in different 
counties and to facilitate development of project parcels that cross county bor-
ders.345 Although it does not involve consolidating substantive regulatory re-
quirements under a single superagency’s administration, the DRECP nonethe-
less incorporates innovative organizational hybridity into its ambitious 
approach. Through the exhaustive efforts of REAT agencies in conjunction 
with creative legislative action by California lawmakers, the DRECP includes 
mechanisms and incentives for standardizing disparate regulatory requirements 
across levels of governance both vertically and horizontally.346  
i. Hybrid Preemption 
The DRECP does not reflect any willingness by California to extend the 
CEC’s preemptive powers over all renewable energy development on state 
lands in the Plan area.347 However, California has opted to provide grants as in-
centives for counties in the Plan area to adopt and/or revise zoning ordinances 
and land-use/conservation plans consistent with the DRECP and its objec-
tives.348 This incentive program provides a general pool of seven million dollars 
for allocation to “qualified counties” to facilitate “the development or revision 
of rules and policies . . . that facilitate the development of eligible renewable 
energy resources. . . .”349 In exchange for the grant money, a county must com-
plete the development or revision within two years.350 The incentive carries an 
additional requirement for DRECP counties: the county must agree to adopt the 
DRECP NCCP (once finalized by the CDFW) or agree to develop its own 
NCCP that is consistent with the DRECP’s goals.351 This limited alternative to 
preemption power under Wiseman’s superagency approach has the potential to 
accomplish the same objective: standardizing local requirements for more of a 
one-size-fits-all compliance process.352  
                                                        
344  See generally Imhoff supra note 156; Logar, supra note 8. 
345  See Wiseman et al., supra note 1, at 871–77. 
346  See LUPA ROD, supra note 288, at 4. 
347  The CEC does have exclusive jurisdiction over and preemption powers over solar-
thermal power plants, like Ivanpah, in the DRECP plan area. E.g., DRAFT DRECP: 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 9, at 9. 
348  See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25619 (West 2016). 
349  Id. 
350  Id. 
351  See id.; see also DRAFT DRECP: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 9, at 9. 
352  See Wiseman et al., supra note 1, at 871–77. 
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ii. Hybrid Consolidation: Tiering 
The primary benefit to developing within a LUPA DFA is the time saved 
due to the BLM’s in-advance programmatic environment review (DRECP EIS) 
of LUPA lands in the DRECP area.353 NEPA requires the BLM to review both 
the possible region-wide impacts of a development and potential site-specific 
impacts on the local environment before approving a project for develop-
ment.354 Because the BLM has already completed, in advance, a region-wide 
review for the Plan area in its DRECP EIS, developers need only complete the 
site-specific environmental review required by NEPA.355 This approach is 
called “tiering.”356 Under the DRECP LUPA, only projects on LUPA DFAs are 
eligible for both tiering and expedited review.357  
Permitting for projects on LUPA DFAs will be significantly expedited due 
to the BLM’s DRECP EIS, but this fact alone does little to address the 
NEPA/CEQA regulatory anticommons. In the LUPA context, NEPA does not 
present a true regulatory anticommons because LUPA DFAs do not implicate 
overlapping jurisdictions; however, LUPA’s allowance for tiering under NEPA 
solves redundancies in the administrative process from the perspective of the 
BLM. Because NEPA is so time consuming for federal agencies, and mostly a 
procedural safeguard, the DRECP LUPA helps mitigate internal administrative 
inefficiency with arguably little risk.  
iii. Evaluating Organizational Hybridity in the DRECP 
 California and the BLM’s efforts are models for future attempts to stream-
line regulatory processes for renewable development. At least in theory, Cali-
fornia’s incentive program is a model not only for intrastate standardization 
across local counties, but also for how standardizing the laws and regulations 
across multiple states might be accomplished. The federal government could 
provide incentives for states to form regional superagencies by signing com-
                                                        
353  Logar, supra note 8, at 380; see also DRAFT DRECP: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 
9, at 24–25 Ex. 4 (providing a summary of the site-specific requirements for projects within 
DFAs). The BLM’s DRECP-LUPA programmatic review incorporates the BLM’s 2012 So-
lar PEIS. Solar PEIS, supra note 295. See DRECP LUPA, supra note 11, at app. w (“Solar 
Programmatic EIS Design Features”). Additionally, the LUPA itself includes a DRECP-area 
specific programmatic review. See generally 2–3 LUPA, supra note 11. 
354  See Outka, supra note 144, at 262–63. See generally discussion supra Section I.D.3. 
355  Logar, supra note 8, at 379–80; see also DRAFT DRECP: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra 
note 9, at 24–26, 46–54. 
356  DRECP LUPA, supra note 11, at 59. 
357  See, e.g., id. Tiering and other incentives for development on DFAs outside the DRECP 
LUPA are available to the extent a county’s land-use codes and regulations on renewable-
energy development have identified lands as non-LUPA DFAs, see DRECP LUPA, supra 
note 11, and allow for such incentives. See DRAFT DRECP: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra 
note 9, at 24; see also O’Shea & Cavanagh, supra note 13. 
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pacts,358 or for states within a region to standardize their laws and statewide sit-
ing/permitting processes. 
Lead state and federal agencies must be vigilant over project-specific 
EIS/EIRs that tier to the DRECP EIS to ensure that possible impacts do not slip 
by.359 Tiering to the DRECP EIS and/or Draft DRECP EIR under NEPA/CEQA 
has the potential to create a gap akin to those found in regulatory commons. 
This gap could arise as a difference in benchmarks for defining region-wide 
and project-specific impacts. In other words, an impact might escape scrutiny 
under CEQA/NEPA if it meets neither the criteria for classification as a re-
gionwide impact nor the criteria for classification as a site-specific impact. 
Such an impact could slip through the cracks and not be included in either the 
DRECP EIS or the site-specific EIR/EIS. Impacts that escape scrutiny will in-
vite interest groups to challenge the project under CEQA/NEPA and prolong 
the permitting process for the project while costly litigation ensues.360 Thus, if 
the BLM is not vigilant for such gaps, tiering might prolong the very process it 
was designed to streamline.361 Acknowledging local concerns in the permitting 
process could help prevent such litigation.362 
4. Will it work? 
“Of course, there is no guarantee that a voluntary process involving a 
large number of stakeholders will succeed. . . .”363 
Ultimately, as it stands today, the DRECP is only a partial solution to anti-
commons-based concerns associated with renewable energy development. Al-
though it has met some success, its ultimate impact on solar development and 
conservation in the Plan area remains to be seen. Although it is a creative and 
comprehensive attempt to promote its objectives within the confines and limita-
tions of hybrid governance, it is ultimately subject to those confines and limita-
tions.  
First, the DRECP does not create an independent agency with any signifi-
cant top-down authority over local governments. REAT agencies do not have 
preemption authority over county-level ordinances or state laws pertaining to 
siting and permitting of PV solar projects.364 The DRECP sets out various ob-
                                                        
358  See Outka, supra note 144, at 276–78; Wiseman, supra note 20, at 529. For a brief dis-
cussion of interstate compacts in the context of renewable energy development, see infra 
note 382. 
359  See generally Logar, supra note 8, at 375–80. 
360  Logar, supra note 8, at 380. 
361  See id. at 381–82. 
362  Id. at 384–85 (citing Imhoff, supra note 156, at 93). 
363  Bellantuono, supra note 37, at 347. 
364  See, e.g., 1 DRAFT DRECP, supra note 147, at I.2-26 to 28, http://drecp.org/draftdrecp/ 
files/b_Volume_I/I.2_Legal_Framework.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WW6-KQG8] [hereinafter 
DRAFT DRECP VOL. I]. The DRECP does not extend the CEC’s jurisdiction to cover wind 
and photovoltaic technologies. Id. 
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jectives for the Plan area, and REAT agencies have agreed to coordinate their 
efforts to achieve the DRECP’s objectives.365 Such voluntary coordination is 
not without significance; however, to the extent their authority is limited, 
REAT agencies are relying on incentives to effectuate cross-county conformity 
with the objectives of the DRECP—incentives that may not be strong enough 
to overcome NIMBY political pressure on county officials.366  
Nonetheless, the incentive program has proved largely a success: Out of 
the fifteen counties eligible for the seven-million-dollar pool of grants, six 
counties have accepted more than three million dollars.367 Five of those six 
counties are in the DRECP area,368 meaning that the incentive program has suc-
ceeded in getting five out of seven DRECP counties to commit to plans that are 
beneficial for renewable energy development. Additionally, three DRECP 
counties have voluntarily collaborated with the CEC in identifying and setting 
aside non-federal lands specifically for renewable development.369 However, 
the counties are far from agreement on many issues—including, for instance, 
whether the DRECP’s strong focus on conservation may in fact stifle, and not 
promote, renewable energy development,370 and whether private lands should 
be developed before public lands.371 To what extent counties and local govern-
ments will voluntarily cooperate with the CEC on such issues remains to be 
seen. 
Second, the DRECP does little to alter the substantive regulatory frame-
work for renewable development in the Plan area.372 REAT agencies do not 
                                                        
365  See generally, e.g., REAT PLANNING AGREEMENT, supra note 311. 
366  Roth, supra note 277. 
367  Assistance to Counties on the State Renewable Energy and Conservation Planning 
Grants (RECPG) Program, ASPEN ENVTL. GROUP http://www.aspeneg.com/projects/assist 
ance-to-counties-on-the-state-recpg-program [https://perma.cc/J7GY-DBTE] (last visited 
Oct. 27, 2017). 
368  Id. The five DRECP counties that accepted grants are Inyo, San Bernadino, Imperial, 
Riverside, and Los Angeles. Id. Kern and San Diego counties have not accepted grants. See 
id. Kern County likely did not need the money, considering how favorable that county is for 
renewable development. See Kern County, DRECP (Mar. 2017), 
http://drecp.org/counties/kern.html [https://perma.cc/PQQ4-UCTG]. 
369  NRDC ET AL., THE DESERT RENEWABLE ENERGY CONSERVATION PLAN STRIKES THE 
RIGHT BALANCE 4 (2016), https://www.defenders.org/publications/ngo_drecp_memo_7_29_ 
16.pdf [https://perma.cc/GK56-BX9L]; see also O’Shea & Cavanagh, supra note 13. How-
ever, development on private lands remains a contentious issue between the CEC and several 
DRECP counties. See Roth, supra note 277. 
370  See, e.g., David Danelski, Environment: Riverside County Objects to Desert Conserva-
tion Plan, THE PRESS-ENTERPRISE (Jul. 12, 2016, 6:08 PM), http://www.pe.com/2016/07/12/ 
environment-riverside-county-objects-to-desert-conservation-plan [https://perma.cc/3LSV-
Z3FC]; Morgan Lee, Solar Energy Blotting Out Nature, Farms in California, SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIB. (Oct. 19, 2015, 6:58 PM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-big-
solar-big-impacts-2015oct19-story.html [https://perma.cc/KMW8-2UH9]. 
371  See O’Shea & Cavanagh, supra note 13; Roth, supra note 277; see also Hernandez et al., 
supra note 144, at 13582. 
372  See, e.g., DRAFT DRECP: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 9, at 23. 
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have the authority to consolidate or alter the various regulatory processes under 
state and federal laws. REAT agencies therefore cannot directly address the 
primary regulatory-anticommons concern with renewable development (i.e., 
overlapping regulatory requirements). Development on a project parcel that 
crosses state and federal land will require, at least for now, independent and 
perhaps duplicative compliance with site-specific analysis under both NEPA 
and CEQA, ESA and CESA, etc.373 Thus, such development remains unfeasi-
ble. 
Although the BLM’s DRECP LUPA EIS provides federal agencies a con-
siderable amount of programmatic, regional impact-assessment information to 
which their future project-specific EISs may tier, the DRECP EIS is fatally lim-
ited for two reasons. First, the DRECP EIS is a programmatic review of only 
BLM-administered lands and is therefore quite limited for purposes of cross 
tiering with EIRs. PV Solar projects on exclusively federal land in California 
do in fact require EIRs374—and such EIRs may tier to the DRECP EIS. Howev-
er, the second reason why the DRECP EIS is fatally limited involves its finite 
usefulness in the circumstance described above: the county in charge of the EIR 
that tiers to the DRECP EIS may deny the solar project regardless of the EIS’s 
content.375 Moreover, such a decision cannot be preempted by any state (or fed-
eral) agency,376 and the substantive decision is effectively unreviewable in 
court.377  
Perhaps the reality of this limitation is one reason why so few applications 
have been submitted for solar-project development on LUPA lands.378 Califor-
nia lawmakers should recognize this limitation and extend to the CEC some 
minimum level of preemption power over county-levels decisions pertaining to 
utility-scale PV solar and wind projects.379 Alternatively, the problem could be 
addressed through a new administrative process for non-judicial re-
view/scrutiny of county-level CEQA decisions pertaining to utility-scale PV 
solar and wind projects.380 
                                                        
373  E.g., id. at 46; see also discussion in supra Part I. 
374  See Troxler, supra note 159, at 172. 
375  See, e.g., Maloney, supra note 205. 
376  See Bilir, supra note 201, at 149–51. Solar thermal power plants (e.g., Ivanpah) and other 
thermal power plants on federal lands are the only exceptions here because the CEC has ex-
clusive jurisdiction over such projects and, should it delegate the lead agency role to a local 
government, it would retain preemption powers over the local government’s decision. See 
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25500 (West 2016); DuVivier, supra note 156, at 198–200; see also 
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25120 (defining thermal powerplant). 
377  Bilir, supra note 201, at 151–52. 
378  See generally Wiseman, supra note 20. 
379  DuVivier, supra note 156, at 198–200. 
380  Bilir, supra note 201, at 150–51. 
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C.  The Challenge of Renewable Energy Governance 
“While a new balance may be justified in the competing goals of energy devel-
opment and environmental protection, perhaps the change should be wrought 
directly, through changes in the laws and regulations that are blamed for de-
lay, rather than by creating ‘superagencies,’ like the proposed EMB [Energy 
Mobilization Board], that will override existing laws and add yet another tier 
to an already complex system of governmental regulation.”381 
The DRECP/REAT approach is not an instance of Wiseman’s proposed re-
gional superagencies. First, the DRECP is not “regional” as Wiseman contem-
plates because California is the only state involved in the effort. Although the 
DRECP represents an innovation in vertical and horizontal coordination be-
tween county governments and federal and intrastate agencies, the DRECP 
lacks horizontal coordination between multiple states—a requisite for Wise-
man’s ideal regional approach. California is the largest state in the U.S., and in 
this sense the DRECP might be considered regional; however, the step from 
intrastate coordination to interstate coordination will prove far more difficult.382 
Moreover, a regional superagency may not even be desirable. 
Wiseman describes the CEC’s intrastate coordination/preemption of county 
regulations/governments for thermal power plant siting as a model for future 
regional governance of renewable parcels;383 however, the CEC’s exclusive ju-
risdiction and preemption powers currently apply only to large-scale thermal 
power plants and solar thermal power plants, and not to wind or photovoltaic 
technologies.384 There is a nonobvious reason for this apparent oddity: it is per-
ceived that small-scale energy facilities and all wind/photovoltaic facilities are 
perceived, whether rightly or wrongly, have larger and more particularized im-
                                                        
381  Cheit, supra note 238, at 747. A Carter-era proposal, the “Energy Mobilization Board,” 
offers an example of the legal issues an interstate superagency might encounter. Carter pro-
posed the EMB “[t]o foster appropriate coordination and integration of local, State and Fed-
eral actions necessary for the approval of [domestic] energy facilities.” Id. at 727 (first al-
teration in original) (quoting U.S. White House, Domestic Policy Staff, Memorandum on 
Specifications of an Operation of an Energy Mobilization Board 1 (July 1979)). 
382  See generally, e.g., Cheit, supra note 238, at 728; Outka, supra note 144, at 289–92, 
295–96. Wiseman’s regional superagencies would be formed through state compacts, which 
require congressional ratification and would then become federal law. See Wiseman, supra 
note 20, at 539. Thus, a regional superagency raises a number of interesting federalism-based 
issues. See generally Outka, supra note 144, at 285–96. The EMB described in Cheit, supra 
note 238, at 727–28, would provide an interesting comparison with Wiseman’s regional 
superagency and the CEC as described in DuVivier, supra note 156, at 189–90, 198–202. 
However, such discussion is beyond the scope of this Note. 
383  See Wiseman, supra note 20, at 514, 524–26. 
384  See generally discussion in Part I, supra. There is a limited exception where the CEC can 
retain jurisdiction over solar thermal facilities that convert to photovoltaic technology. CAL. 
PUB. RES. CODE §§ 25120, 25500.1(a). 
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pacts at the local level, and therefore that siting and permitting of such facilities 
should be left to local/county governments.385 
Wiseman’s regional superagency approach would require a delicate bal-
ance of possibly incompatible objectives. First, Wiseman suggests that her ap-
proach should not reduce the number of rights, interests, or voices of concern 
pertaining to a renewable project, but rather that they should be procedurally 
consolidated under a regional superagency. However, a regional superagency 
with jurisdiction over many projects in multiple states would likely have just as 
many disputes to resolve.386 Thus, this solution has the potential to exacerbate 
the problem.387 Perhaps a more formal version of the DRECP/REAT’s dynamic 
dispute resolution procedure could mitigate this concern, but even such an ap-
proach involves a potentially lengthy and cumbersome process. 
The alternative to regional structural reform would be regional organiza-
tional reform, which is an unlikely prospect. First, a regional superagency un-
der such an approach would require something akin to takings power over 
rights involved in a renewable project, a sort of renewable energy eminent do-
main, which would likely be. Second, this approach would require significant 
substantive changes to the laws that create such rights (e.g., CEQA and NEPA), 
another politically unlikely feat. Perhaps incentives like those used in Califor-
nia for the DRECP can help, but, as discussed above, they would likely be inef-
fective for more contentious issues. 
The CEC’s preemption powers and one-stop-shop approach to energy gov-
ernance perhaps represent an ideal solution. However, applying the superagen-
cy model to a multistate region would require careful planning and lawmaking 
to avoid the potential pitfalls of such a solution. Moreover, 
extending the CEC’s approach to include interstate preemption powers will 
prove a political and legal challenge—perhaps even an impossibility. 
CONCLUSION 
“Part and parcel of protecting our environment is the energy industry’s desire 
to see us open up more areas of it to future development.”388 
 Of principal importance in concluding this discussion is reiterating that 
even the most complex and difficult anticommons issues facing renewable de-
velopment today are not arguments against regulation.389 The footprint of re-
                                                        
385  See generally Duvivier, supra note 156. 
386  One of the concerns with the “Energy Mobilization Board” was that it would be over-
whelmed by the number of projects over which it would have jurisdiction. See Cheit, supra 
note 238, at 745. 
387  See Bellantuono, supra note 37, at 349. 
388  Matthew DiLallo, Will the Government Work with Energy Companies?, MOTLEY FOOL 
(Mar. 9, 2013, 4:00 PM), https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2013/03/09/will-the-
government-work-with-energy-companies.aspx [https://perma.cc/5HY6-KBP7]. 
389  See Bellantuomo, supra note 37, at 330; Wiseman, supra note 20, at 509–11. 
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newable-energy development is immense—in terms of land, water, and a host 
of other equally important variables.390 Regulation is the only bulwark against a 
host of potential tragedies at stake in large-scale disruptions of habitat. Loom-
ing over every decision to develop is the unknown, and the difference between 
too much regulation and too little regulation might be the difference between an 
endangered species thriving or going extinct.391 Decisions to develop any large-
scale infrastructure, including renewables, should not be made lightly.392 Thus, 
the problem of the anticommons is a challenge to regulate more effectively and 
more efficiently—but certainly not to regulate less. Regulation is as necessary 
in the renewable context as in any other context, but alternatives to fossil fuels 
are just as necessary.  
Developing more utility-scale solar energy projects is an essential compo-
nent of any meaningful solution to address the global threat of climate 
change.393 Nonetheless, such development implicates a wide range of societal, 
environmental, and cultural values.394 Balancing those values against the threat 
of climate change may not weigh in favor of developing a utility-scale solar fa-
cility in every instance and at every available opportunity.395 Such questions are 
complex and beyond the scope of this Note. Suffice it to say that success in fa-
cilitating utility-scale solar development should not be measured merely in 
terms of quantitative benchmarks (e.g., by the number of utility-scale solar fa-
cilities springing up in the deserts of California, or by the number of Megawatts 
in a state’s renewable energy portfolio).396 
Utility-scale solar also implicates broader questions of economics and poli-
tics—issues which the law is not always well equipped to address. For instance, 
the Ivanpah facility, though it had its setbacks,397 survived the regulatory pro-
cess and now produces enough carbon-dioxide-free clean energy to fuel the 
needs of over 140,000 homes.398 However, serious questions remain: whether 
the $2.2 billion project will survive due to economic concerns;399 whether its 
400 MW capacity was worth the ecological trade-offs, sacrifices, and compro-
mises required for its construction;400 and, more broadly, whether utility-scale 
                                                        
390  See Wiseman, supra note 20, at 509. See generally Outka, supra note 144. 
391  See Outka, supra note 144, at 250 n.42. “For one species to mourn the death of another is 
a new thing under the sun.” ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES 
HERE AND THERE 110 (1949). 
392  Wiseman, supra note 20, at 509. See generally Outka, supra note 144. 
393  See Hernandez et al., supra note 144, at 773. 
394  See Wiseman, supra note 20, at 528; Lee, supra note 152; Roth, supra note 161. 
395  See generally Outka, supra note 144; see also, generally, Wiseman, supra note 20. 
396  See Hybrid Energy Governance, supra note 146, at 56. 
397  See generally Logar, supra note 8, at 367–69. 
398  Ivanpah Project Facts, supra note 29. 
399  See generally Sweet, supra note 36. 
400  See Outka, supra note 144, at 250; Logar, supra note 8, at 367–69. But see Warburg, su-
pra note 15 (explaining the benefits of utility-scale solar, especially on land like abandoned 
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solar development is a good idea at all—especially considering the as-yet un-
harnessed potential of distributed solar generation.401  
Utility-scale renewable developers also face public and private opposition 
on the New Energy Frontier. Even environmentalists are split on the question 
of utility-scale solar.402 On the one hand, photovoltaic solar panels could power 
all of America’s electricity needs if just 0.6 percent of America’s land surface 
were set aside and dedicated to large-scale solar production.403 On the other 
hand, dedicating just 10 percent of rooftop space in Southern California to dis-
tributed-scale solar panels could provide as much as 80 percent of the region’s 
electricity needs—without threatening wildlife or habitats.404 However, these 
two options are not mutually exclusive. With careful, informed planning, regu-
                                                                                                                                 
farms etc.). See generally Hernandez et al., supra note 144; see also, generally, Lee, supra 
note 152. 
401  See Lee, supra note 152 (noting that “most solar can be located over landfills, parking 
lots and rooftops”); see also, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman, Solar Energy Development on the 
Federal Public Lands: Environmental Trade-Offs on the Road to a Lower-Carbon Future, 3 
SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 107, 150 n.225 (2011–2012) (“Given the problems 
faced by [solar-concentrator facilities] in terms of water use, transmission lines, and land 
footprint, it seems painfully obvious to many people, like those at [the Center for Biological 
Diversity], that the nation’s best solution for renewable solar is a massive system of photo-
voltaic cells located on rooftops in urban areas.” (second alteration in original) (quoting 
Glennon & Reeves, supra note 16, at 123)). 
402  See Logar, supra note 8, at 367–69. See generally, e.g., Chris Mooney, Why Big Solar 
and Environmentalists Are Clashing over the California Desert, WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/08/15/the-
greens-and-solar-industry-agree-on-climate-but-they-cant-agree-on-the-california-
desert/?utm_term=.f5db6fb6abbd [https://perma.cc/7HTL-HRTV]; Sammy Roth, Why Utili-
ties and Environmentalists Are Teaming Up Against the Solar Industry, DESERT SUN (July 
29, 2016, 5:22 PM), http://www.desertsun.com/story/tech/science/energy/2016/07/29/why-
utilities-and-environmentalists-teaming-up-against-solar-industry/87677852 
[https://perma.cc/7QEJ-L438]. 
403  Warburg, supra note 15 (citing Paul Denholm & Robert Margolis, Land-Use Require-
ments and the Per-Capita Solar Footprint for Photovoltaic Generation in the United States, 
36 ENERGY POLICY 3531, 3539, 3541 (2008)). But see Gabriel Reilich & Jordan Crucchiola, 
The Amount of Land Required to Run America on Solar Power Is Shockingly Small, GOOD 
(Apr. 22 2016) https://www.good.is/infographics/solar-power-all-of-america 
[https://perma.cc/397L-9GPJ] (explaining that the land requirements of supporting infra-
structure would greatly increase the total amount of land required to run America on exclu-
sively solar energy, and that uses of storage and energy requirements in times of emergency 
might make America’s complete reliance on solar technologies impractical and even unde-
sirable). By comparison, 0.6 percent of America’s land surface equates to just two percent of 
land currently dedicated to crop production. Warburg, supra note 15. 
404  MICHAEL F. ALLEN & ALAN MCHUGHEN, SOLAR POWER IN THE DESERT: ARE THE 
CURRENT LARGE-SCALE SOLAR DEVELOPMENTS REALLY IMPROVING CALIFORNIA’S 
ENVIRONMENT? 9 (2011) (citing Emily C. Warmann & G. Darrel Jenerette, Two Paths To-
wards Solar Energy: Photovoltaic vs. Solar Thermal, 91 BULL. ECOLOGICAL SOC’Y AM. 173 
(Apr. 2010)). 
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lation, and decisionmaking, utility-scale renewables can be implemented with-
out major disruptions in the region’s complex ecosystems.405 
As complex as it is controversial, the DRECP represents a monumental un-
dertaking by multiple agencies across all levels of government, and it reflects 
numerous innovative legal solutions to the many shortcomings of renewable 
energy governance as it stands today. This Note has highlighted just a few of 
the DRECP’s unique approaches to interagency coordination and innovative 
hybrid institutions for addressing some of the anticommons problems facing 
utility scale solar development in California. While this Note leaves many 
rocks unturned, it has made an effort to draw a roadmap for more specific fu-
ture inquiries. Although the DRECP does little to directly reform renewable en-
ergy governance, its ultimate value rests in the example it sets, new ideas it 
provides, and future innovations it will inspire. The DRECP itself is an innova-
tion—yet another model for future efforts, yet another example of patterns 
worth repeating and patterns worth discarding, and yet another iteration of 
“something new under the sun.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
405  See generally DRECP INDEP. SCI. PANEL, FINAL REPORT: INDEPENDENT SCIENCE REVIEW 
FOR THE CALIFORNIA DESERT RENEWABLE ENERGY CONSERVATION PLAN (DRECP) (2012), 
http://nrm.dfg.ca.gov/FileHandler.ashx?DocumentID=58775 [https://perma.cc/89QW-
HYU4]. But see generally Barbara Boyle & Sarah Friedman, Senior Campaign Representa-
tives, Sierra Club Beyond Coal Campaign, & Joan Taylor, Chair, Sierra Club Desert Energy 
Committee, Comment Letter on Draft Desert Renewable Energy Conservation Plan (Feb. 23, 
2015). 
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